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Judith Macfarlane* Beyond the Right to Offend:
Academic Freedom, Rights and
Responsibilities in the Canadian
University Classroom
The principle of academic freedom accords a wide latitude to professorial speech
in the classroom setting. This article argues that there are principles and sources
of law which are imported into the professorial employment contract and which
place limits on the exercise of that speech. These include contractual obligations
of competence and non-discriminatory behaviour, as well as terms drawn from
human rights legislation. Drawing on an examination of case law and labour
arbitral awards, the author outlines ways in which the right of academic free
speech might be balanced against these limiting considerations.
Le principe de la libert6 acad~mique accorde une grande latitude A I'allocution
professorale dans la salle de classe. Cet article argumente qu'ily a des principes
et des sources de droit qui sont import~s dans le contrat d'emploi des professeurs
et imposent des limites sur I'exercice de cette allocution. Ceux-ci incluent des
obligations contractuelles telles la comp6tence et le comportement non
discriminatoire, ainsi que I'utilisation de termes tir6s des legislations sur les droits
humains. En se basant sur une 6tude du droit jurisprudentiel et les d6cisions
arbitrales du travail, I'auteur d~crit des moyens dans lesquels le droit de la liberte
de parole dans un milieu acad6mique se balancerait peut-6tre contre ses
considdrations.
Introduction
Those involved in the debate over a professor's right to academic freedom
in Canada fall generally into two groups: those who accept that academic
freedom is limited by other responsibilities and those who posit that
academic freedom should be unrestricted in virtually all circumstances.
In this paper I argue that the latter view-the "absolutist" vision of
academic freedom-is too limited and fails to adequately consider the
competing legal and philosophical obligations that faculty members owe
to their students and to the university. This narrow focus renders the
absolutist analysis problematic at every turn. While acknowledging that
* Judith Macfarlane is a Vancouver lawyer practicing labour and employment law at Farris,
Vaughan, Wills & Murphy. This article was written in partial requirement of an LL.M at the
University of Ottawa, and the author would like to thank Prof. John Manwaring for his helpful
comments in developing this paper.
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academic free speech is an extremely important concept that must not be
disregarded lightly, I argue that the absolutist view is not the necessary
or the most desirable alternative. Rather, as in other areas of the law where
speech rights may clash with other equally important rights, the key is to
attempt to identify and balance competing concerns.
Because of my contention that the legal basis for a claim to academic
freedom in the Canadian context is grounded in the professor's employ-
ment contract, I examine the features of the various agreements that
govern faculty employment at Canadian universities. Those who have
focused solely on professorial rights have failed to properly consider the
legal framework of these rights and how the professor's competing
employment responsibilities can and should limit the right to absolute
academic freedom. In particular, the legal responsibility not to create a
"poisoned" environment in the classroom on any ground protected by
human rights legislation is an integral part of the professor's responsibili-
ties. Therefore, I consider both the law and the important theoretical basis
underlying the poisoned environment concept.
Academic freedom absolutists have argued that the poisoned environ-
ment test is overbroad and purely subjective, and will therefore result in
an unworkable "slippery slope" for measuring classroom conduct. How-
ever, this reading of the poisoned environment test is neither necessary
nor likely to be employed by arbitrators, given past jurisprudence on
harassment. In fact, the poisoned environment test can and should be
crafted to reflect the particular concerns of the university setting and an
objective standard of harm. Further, the poisoned environment test is an
important safeguard in ensuring that the university's service is provided
to all students, without marginalizing vulnerable groups that have tradi-
tionally been excluded from the academy. The limited vision of academic
freedom absolutists fails to acknowledge the reality of the professor's
position and power in the classroom, and how effectively they might be
used to limit meaningful access to post-secondary education for particu-
lar students.
Having laid out the principles for interpreting academic freedom
protection, I then consider how they should be applied to the spectrum of
classroom conduct, using some of the situations which have arisen on
North American campuses as a framework for discussion. I argue that in
measuring whether a professor's speech or conduct is an allowable and
protected exercise of academic freedom under the terms of employment,
an arbitrator should exercise varying levels of deference to the professor's
actions, depending on the nature of the academic pursuit that is involved.
The broadest allowance should be given where an academic idea or
theory itself is under attack, rather than simply the choice to utilize a
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particular style of presentation. Lastly, I consider how the university
might respond where it faces a situation where the rights of the students
and the professor are both compelling.
I. Theories of Academic Freedom
Before examining the legal issues around academic freedom, it is impor-
tant to consider the spectrum of positions in the debate on a more
philosophical level. Academic freedom has been variously described, but
most definitions are premised on the more general concept of free speech
and the liberal notion of the state as reflected in the work of J.S. Mill and
others. This outlook is founded on "the value of freedom of expression,
the appealing imagery of the free flow of ideas, and the not coincidental
metaphor of the 'marketplace of ideas'."' As one Supreme Court of
Canada judge has noted, "the principle of freedom of speech and
expression has been firmly accepted as a necessary feature of modem
democracy."2
With its mandate to provide a forum for free thought, and to push the
boundaries of accepted truth, the university (in theory anyway) actualizes
the "marketplace of ideas" notion.' This unique and very important
mandate provides the underlying rationale for academic freedom. In
order to freely pursue new information and knowledge, faculty must be
protected from interference. The Canadian Association of University
Teachers (CAUT) "Model Clause on Academic Freedom" reflects this
concern. It states:
The common good of society depends on the search for knowledge and its
free exposition. Academic freedom in universities is essential to both these
purposes in the teaching function of the university as well as in its
scholarship and research.... The parties agree that they will not infringe
or abridge the academic freedom of any member of the academic commu-
nity. Academic members of the community are entitled, regardless of
prescribed doctrine, to freedom in carrying out research and in publishing
the results thereof, freedom of teaching and of discussion, freedom to
1. P. Hughes "Reconciling Valuable Interests; Or Academic Freedom as Academic Respon-
sibility" (1994) 44 U.N.B. L.J. 79 at 79 [hereinafter "Reconciling Valuable Interests"].
2. McIntyre J. writing for the majority of the court in R. W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd.,
[1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 at 583, 33 D.L.R. (4th) 174.
3. "[A]cademic freedom is important within the 'liberal' conception of the university because
universities are not only purveyors of the known but creators and disseminators of the new. To
fulfil this crucial creative role, universities require openness, the free exchange of ideas,
controversy, ferment, dissent, even heresy": B. Shrank, "Academic Freedom and the Inclusive
University" CAUT Bulletin (May 1994) 9.
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criticize the university and the faculty association, and freedom from
institutional censorship.4
The important goals of academic freedom are widely accepted and
valued. There is less consensus, however, over exactly what should be
included within the rubric of "protected" academic free speech. In
particular the debate has focused on speech that has the potential to harm
students because it may be discriminatory or harassing, and creates a
"poisoned" atmosphere. The crux of the debate is where the professor's
right to absolute academic freedom should give way to other responsibili-
ties and considerations.
Much of this debate was brought to the forefront when the Ontario
government issued a policy "Framework" document in October 1993.1
The Framework document called for Ontario universities to implement
new policies, or bring old policies in line with a set of guidelines in order
to end discrimination on campus (including the creation of a poisoned
environment in the classroom).6 Many individuals and groups denounced
the terminology used in the Framework document, although they did not
necessarily advocate an unrestricted definition of academic freedom.7
4. "Model Clause on Academic Freedom" (Approved May 1977) in CAUT, Handbook of
Policy Statements and Model Clauses, 4th ed. (Ottawa: CAUT, 1986) at 4 [hereinafter CA UT
Handbook]: The CAUT is a national organization for Canadian university professors and acts
in a variety of capacities, including lobbying for professorial rights, and advising faculty
associations and professors who are in conflict with the university administration. The CAUT
is not an official representative in collective agreements or collective bargaining with
universities, but contributes a great deal to the debate on academic freedom and other relevant
concerns.
5. Often referred to as the "zero tolerance" policy, or the "Framework document", see Ontario
Ministry of Education and Training News Release, "Province Announces First System-wide
Policy Framework to Prevent Harassment and Discrimination at Ontario Colleges and
Universities" (7 October 1993), as cited in N. Gillespie, "Sexual Harassment Policies in the
University Context" (1995) 3 C.L.E.L.J. 225 at 236.
6. Critics charged that rather than bringing campus policies into line with human rights
obligations, the Framework document was broader and expanded the scope of conduct that
would be outlawed. In the face of such criticism the Minister of Education and Training, David
Cooke, "clarified that his intention was for the guidelines to be used to review policies to assist
universities to assess their compliance with existing legal requirements under the [Human
Rights] Code, not to impose new requirements or to override existing policies", ibid. at 236.
7. Even among those who are concerned about discrimination against vulnerable groups in the
university there were those who disliked the terms used in the document. See for example J.
Sangster & P. Zeleza, "Academic Freedom in Context" (1994) 29 J. Can. Stud. 139 at 140: "[the
document] defined harassment so vaguely that its admonition to ban discussions which 'made
students feel uncomfortable' was a clear affront to academic freedom"; and S. Richer & L.
Weir, eds., "Introduction" in Beyond Political Correctness: Toward the Inclusive University
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995) at 8: "we believe there were major problems with
the drafting of the Framework, including the choice of 'zero tolerance' as a code name." The
CAUT issued a formal response to the Framework, which raised these and other concerns:
CAUT Academic Freedom and Tenure Committee, Reply To the Ontario Government:
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However, the reaction to the Framework document from some quar-
ters was that academic freedom must be completely unrestricted. In
particular, a group of professors at Trent University signed a petition
which has become known as "The Right To Offend" document. That
document asserted that academic freedom
includes the right to express and the right of access to intellectual materials
which express racially ethnically or sexually discriminatory ideas, opin-
ions, or feelings, just as it includes the right to expressions that favour
inequality of incomes or benefits. It also includes the right to make others
uncomfortable, to injure by expression anyone's self-esteem, and to
create, by expression, atmospheres in which some may not feel welcome
or accepted.... [Academic freedom] includes, moreover, the right to use
language in any traditional, quaint or dated manner, because the regulation
of such expression would both contravene the principle of free expression
and also stifle legitimate debate and the proper relationship of language to
social progress.'
This document represents one of the most expansive views of professorial
rights in the spectrum of the Canadian debate-an absolutist position on
academic freedom.
The "right to offend" theorists clearly view the professor's right to free
speech as paramount. Further, many advocates of unfettered academic
freedom reject the notion that anti-discrimination policies are required at
all, arguing against the idea that there is a realistic fear of discriminatory
speech being used harmfully in university classrooms. 9 In their view,
"enforced sensitivity" to racial or gender issues is an unnecessary and
unwarranted interference with the university's mandate to seek truth and
knowledge, and an infringement on academic freedom. Certainly, these
theorists do not view the goals of the anti-discrimination movement as
being important enough to outweigh the professor's rights to absolute
academic freedom.
Academic Staff and the Ontario Government's Framework Document (Ottawa: CAUT, 1994)
[hereinafter Reply].
8. The document was signed by a group of professors at Trent University and circulated with
a covering letter written by Professor John Fekete: Gillespie, supra note 5 at 237. The statement
was later endorsed by the McMaster University Faculty Association: Richer & Weir, ibid. at 8.
9. This is often premised on the assumption that the "rights" movement is based on faulty
theory. For example, John Fekete asserts that "biofeminists" have exaggerated the plight of
women in Canada, in order to meet their political goals: "the violence against women scare,
more than any other, is the model reference point for putting the internal life of universities in
jeopardy." See J. Fekete, Moral Panic: Biopolitics Rising (Montreal-Toronto: Robert Davies
Publishing, 1994) at 203 [hereinafter Moral Panic]. Thus, university policies that seek to
protect women from the harm of a harassing environment are faulty, according to Fekete,
because they are based on false notions of women's precarious place in society. American
theorists such as Dinesh D'Souza are similarly dubious about race theory in the U.S. See
generally D. D'Souza, Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus (New
York: The Free Press, 1991).
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Even among theorists who place a higher value on equality goals, there
is a tendency to view free speech as the overriding or pre-eminent
concern. This is based on the notion that there can be no equality without
free speech. Alan Borovoy explains:
[F]reedom of speech is a strategic freedom-a fundamental freedom on
which other freedoms depend. Democrats believe that injustice and error
are less likely to occur or endure in an atmosphere of free public debate.10
This latter statement reflects the liberal belief that if ideas are submitted
to the "marketplace" for scrutiny, then the best ideas will naturally
surface and those such as racism or sexism will fail-assuming they are
not the most logically rigorous.
In this paper, I argue that the "right to offend" and similar arguments
for unrestricted academic freedom are fundamentally flawed in that they
misunderstand and trivialize anti-discrimination goals, and focus nar-
rowly on the unrestricted rights of faculty. This is clear from the earliest
point in the debate: the way that they frame the question to be answered.
First, these theorists argue that anti-discrimination measures signify a
new regime of intolerance which they label "political correctness.''I
Comparisons are drawn to Nazi Germany or the McCarthy era for
example. 2 The crux of the argument is that the goals of so called
"political correctness" are not important enough to merit serious consid-
eration. The historical comparisons imply that what is thought of as
"correct" today may prove to be as flawed as the values of those eras. The
"trivial" concerns of political correctness are then matched against the
venerable Western liberal tradition of a free and fearless search for
knowledge. For example, John Fekete frames the debate as pitting "the
backlash of the new censorship and the new authoritarianism against the
precious freedoms and tolerances which are the basic distinguishing
features of the culture of Western modernity." 13
Underpinning this process is a disregard or outright denial of the harm
that particular groups endure when they are stereotyped and insulted on
the basis of sex, race, religion and like characteristics. Some of these
theorists deny that women, racial minorities, the disabled and others are
10. A. Borovoy, "When Rights Collide" (1994)44 U.N.B. L.J. 49 at 50. This is often linked
to an argument that women and minorities should be particularly concerned with speech rights,
as they are its "beneficiaries", ibid.
11. For a very thorough discussion of the politics behind the "political correctness" label, see
S. McIntyre, "Backlash Against Equality: The 'Tyranny' of the 'Politically Correct"' (1993)
38 McGill L.J. 1.
12. Fekete expands this list to include comparisons to "medieval Christendom, the Iran of the
ayatollahs, ... or the Stalinist USSR": Moral Panic, supra note 9 at 203-4.
13. J. Fekete, "Against Zero Tolerance" (1994) 29 J. Can. Stud. 144 at 148.
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in need of any particular protection in the academy. 4 Further, when
members of these groups report their experience in the institution (that is
through being identified negatively because of the personal characteris-
tic) there is a trivialization and a denial of their claims. Fekete argues that
groups are afforded protection, made "61ite" as it were, because of their
"elementary, biological demarcation."' 5
These techniques make it easier to resist any serious discussion of
limiting the content of allowable speech in the classroom, or elsewhere
on campus. Obviously, when framed this way the argument is simple:
anti-discrimination arguments cannot hold up. The problem, however, is
in the framing of the question. Recognition of the right to equality for
women and minorities (including the right to fully participate at the
university without being degraded) may be more recent in origins than the
liberal democratic notion of free speech, but it is of no less importance,
legally or philosophically. This important goal must be given equal
footing with the goals advanced by Fekete and others.
The emphasis on the professor's absolute freedom has led to a failure
to acknowledge or properly consider the professor's legal or philosophi-
cal responsibilities to the student. These may be viewed as the "academic
responsibilities" that go along with the right to academic freedom. 16
Throughout the arguments of people like John Fekete there is an under-
lying denial of the fact that all participants in the university classroom do
14. Moral Panic, supra note 9 at 203: "In practice... biopolitics... links disadvantage to
'the disadvantaged', that is to elite groups, assigned privileged standing by virtue of their
putatively oppressed condition .... As we have seen, biopolitics is given toformalism-the
designation of elites through elementary, biological demarcation (women, disabled, racial
minorities, aboriginals)." Further, "the stuff about encouraging vulnerable people to report
injuries, protecting 'human rights' and removing inequalities is an alibi: it is not the real stuff
of which daily experience around these issues is made", ibid. at 205.
While it is not within the scope of this paper to "prove" the disadvantage that particular
groups suffer in Canadian society, I would assert that this has been well accepted in a variety
of cases before the Supreme Court. See for example Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd., [1989]
1 S.C.R. 1252, 59 D.L.R. (4th) 352 [hereinafter Janzen cited to S.C.R.] (which considered
sexism); R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 114 A.R. 81 [hereinafter Keegstra cited to S.C.R.]
(which considered anti-Semitism). Fekete does not provide evidence to refute the existence of
bigotry towards minorities and women.
15. Ibid. This is a fundamental misunderstanding of rights theory. Groups are defined
because of the way society has treated them on the basis of their personal characteristic, not
simply because the characteristic exists.
16. Patricia Hughes, "Reconciling Valuable Interests", supra note I at 82, has described that
"the privilege we enjoy as teachers to work and play with words and ideas demands that we
accept the obligation to exercise that privilege not as an individual right but as a form of public
service." As will be outlined in this paper, these more theoretical notions are also reflected in
the legal parameters of the professors' employment obligations.
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not share the professor's experience, both of having the authority to
speak, and to be listened to. Thus, these theorists argue that the university
must protect all speech in the classroom, including hate speech, and that
women and minority students must simply battle to refute these ideas
when a professor endorses them.
This sort of argument is premised on the fallacious notion that there is
an "even playing field" at work. As Stanley Fish has argued (in a broader
context) this reasoning generally obscures the "true facts of the situation
as it has been given to us by history: the playing field is already tilted in
favour of those by whom and for whom it was constructed in the first
place.... The playing field is already rigged."'17 Fish's comments arise
from a more general argument that the "marketplace" is skewed in favour
of the voices that have traditionally dominated (to the exclusion of
women and minorities). Theorists like Fekete refuse to acknowledge that
a power imbalance even exists, never mind that they might be the
beneficiaries of it. One of the effects of characterizing the equality
concerns as "politically correct" is that it "conveniently divests those with
privilege of the need to examine critically the university as a site of
unequal power relations."8
Perhaps the most telling aspect of the absolutist "platform" is the way
that its proponents would treat even the most explicit examples where
classroom power is abused. There are serious situations that have oc-
curred in Canada, underscoring the potential for professors' behaviour to
exclude students.' 9 Yet there is no acknowledgement that these sorts of
situations indicate that there might be valid concerns on Canadian
campuses that go beyond a need for "enforced sensitivity." By denying
this potential harm, these advocates can disregard the need for any
dialogue about the reasonable boundaries of academic freedom.
If the university is truly an institution committed to truth and democ-
racy, it must be concerned about issues of equality and the historical
marginalization of particular groups. If women and minorities are effec-
tively shut out of the university community by discriminatory speech (as
will be argued later in this paper), this circumscribes the notion of the
university as a site of truth-seeking, and indeed as a meritocracy.
Proponents of speech codes on American campuses have raised a
17. S. Fish, There's No Such Thing As Free Speech and Its a Good Thing Too (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1994) at 62.
18. Sangster & Zeleza, supra note 7 at 141-2.
19. Perhaps one of the worst examples is seen in University of Manitoba and University of
Manitoba Faculty Association (May 13, 1993) (Arbitrator Freedman) (Collin Grievance)
(unreported) [hereinafter "Collin grievance"]. The case is discussed in greaterdetail later in this
paper (see infra notes 151-160 and accompanying text).
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compelling argument that hate speech needs to be limited in order for
universities "to fulfil their educational mission of teaching respect for
human dignity and individual self-worth."20 Further, "since hateful
speech subverts universality of communicative exchange and inquiry" it
should be controlled.
21
The CAUT Status of Women Committee (SWC) has argued that the
university should seek to be inclusive for all participants, and that
academic freedom must therefore be based on reciprocity and mutual
respect between the professor and the student. They argue that
[w]ords cease to be an expression of academic freedom when they have an
effect that interferes with the academic freedom of other people, repress-
ing, constraining or prohibiting scholarship or inquiry. 2
Therefore, claiming a right to marginalize or discriminate may limit the
academic freedom of those who are targeted, thus frustrating the original
goal of fostering a climate for the advancement of knowledge.
The movement to provide a classroom free of hostility for historically
disadvantaged groups is premised on a belief that the university can only
fulfil its important purpose when true equality is seen as a key institu-
tional goal. Where racist or sexist language, for example, are employed,
the professor has lost sight of this mission. Sheila McIntyre argues that
it should be astonishing when teachers equate thoughtfulness about what
they say with censorship or publicly admit fear about being held account-
able for classroom jokes about women, homosexuals or racial minorities.
If one believes that equality is desirable but far from achieved, it is hard
to understand how change will occur unless those who, consciously or
unconsciously, manifest and reproduce offensive practices and attitudes
become self-conscious about the harms they cause.23
The Canadian commitment to end discrimination is not simply reflected
in philosophical arguments, but rather in law and legislation also.
Pronouncements from Canada's highest court have been clear: although
freedom of speech is a fundamental right protected by the Charter,24 so
too are equality rights, and a balancing of the two is required. 25 As further
evidence of the Canadian commitment to ending discrimination against
20. M.F. Major, "American Campus Speech Codes: Models for Canadian Universities?"
(1995) 7 Educ. & L.J. 13 at 22.
21. Ibid. at 23.
22. J. Drakich, M. Taylor & J. Bankier, "Academic Freedom IS the Inclusive University"
CAUTBulletin: Status of Women Supplement (April 1994) [hereinafter CA UTStatus of Women
Supplement] at 3 [emphasis added].
23. Supra note 11 at 61 [emphasis added].
24. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
25. See R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, 89 D.L.R. (4th) 449; and Keegstra, supra note 14.
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historically marginalized groups, all of the provinces have adopted
human rights legislation to protect these groups in the private sector. The
Supreme Court has affirmed the extreme importance of the goals of
human rights legislation, affording it "quasi-constitutional" status.26
When we accept the parallel importance of equality rights and freedom
of speech we are presented with a different question than that posed by
the "right to offend" theorists: how do we balance the two very important
goals of preserving academic freedom, and providing a university class-
room that is free from discrimination? This question demands a more
thoughtful analysis than that performed by academic freedom absolutists,
but will ultimately yield a more useful answer. As will be seen throughout
this paper, the failure of these theorists to acknowledge this more
complex question has led them to flawed analysis through every aspect
of the debate. In particular, their narrow vision has resulted in a failure to
properly consider the competing obligations they owe to students, both
morally and legally, and the potential for their behaviour to harm,
marginalize and restrict the freedom of others.
II. The Legal Status of Academic Freedom in Canada
Despite all of the philosophical debate about academic freedom rights in
Canadian universities, there has been a dearth of discussion about its legal
parameters. Perhaps this is because in Canada, unlike in the United States,
there is no constitutional basis in which to frame the right.27 The
McKinney and Harrison cases established that the Charter does not apply
to the university,28 and so academic freedom (insofar as it exists between
26. See for example Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. Simpson Sears Ltd., [1985] 2
S.C.R. 536, 23 D.L.R. (4th) 321 [hereinafter Simpson Sears cited to S.C.R.]; CNR Co. v.
Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114, 40 D.L.R. (4th) 577; and
Robichaud v. Canada (Treasury Board), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 84,40 D.L.R. (4th) 577 [hereinafter
Robichaud cited to S.C.R.], where the Supreme Court affirmed that the unique "quasi-
constitutional" nature of the legislation means that it should be given a broad, purposive and
liberal reading, because of the extreme importance of its goals. More specific arguments about
the appropriate standard for discrimination under human rights legislation are made infra in
this paper at section III.
27. In the United States, the right to academic freedom for teachers at all levels (elementary
to post-secondary) is grounded in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution,
assuming that they are employed by a state actor (as opposed to a private institution). Further,
the First Amendment protection itself is broader than the Charter s. 2(b) (freedom of
expression) because there is no limiting language akin to s. I of the Charter. Therefore,
although the American case law can provide useful insights into some aspects of the academic
freedom discussion this important distinction must be borne in mind. For a full comparison of
American jurisprudence, see Major, supra note 20.
28. McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229, 76 D.L.R. (4th) 545 [hereinafter
McKinney cited to S.C.R.]; and Harrison v. University of British Columbia [19901 3 S.C.R.
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the university and the professor) cannot said to be based on constitutional
freedom of expression.29 Neither is there any statutory or common law
rule that establishes the right.
It would appear that the professor's legal right to claim specific
academic freedom protection in Canada is based solely in the employ-
ment contract between the professor and the university. This may be as
part of the collective agreement or as an incorporated term of employment
under a "special plan" arrangement.
1. The Legal Relationship Between Universities and Faculty in
Canada
Given the significance of the employment arrangement to academic
freedom, it is important to examine the various sorts of employment
arrangements that exist in Canadian universities. There are two major
sorts of relationships: those governed by a recognized collective agree-
451, 77 D.L.R. (4th) 55. The court considered submissions from a number of Canadian
universities, and held that in the sphere of relations with their employees the universities were
not government actors so as to attract Charter scrutiny.
29. The possibility for a Charter argument on judicial review of a labour arbitrator's decision
is not clearly settled. It is possible that if an arbitrator is found to be a government actor, his
decisions could attract Charter scrutiny (for example as an infringement on s. 2(b) freedom of
expression). D.J. Brown & P.M. Beatty, Canadian LabourArbitration, 3d ed. (Aurora: Canada
Law Book, 1988) at 2-46 explain that in Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1
S.C.R. 1038, 59 D.L.R. (4th) 416 [hereinafter Slaight Communications cited to S.C.R.], the
Court held that "adjudicators exercising delegated powers, such as those conferred under s.
61.6 of the Canadian Labour Code (now R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2, ss. 240-244) are bound by the
Charter since they are creatures of statute" [emphasis added]. (In that case the Supreme Court
found that the order did infringe on the freedom of expression but was saved under s. I as being
a reasonable measure.) However, Slaight Communications dealt with an adjudicator applying
the Canada Labour Code. It is not clear whether the same finding would apply to an arbitrator
interpreting the collective agreement. Labour relations statutes simply require that the
collective agreement provide for a method of dispute resolution, with mandatory arbitration as
a default if they do not. Therefore, the parties normally agree to givejurisdiction to the arbitrator
under the collective agreement. This is not the same as Slaight Communications, where the
adjudicator's powers were explicitly delegated through the statute. Brown & Beatty, ibid., do
point out that in Douglas Kwantlen Faculty Assn. v. Douglas College, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 570, 77
D.L.R. (4th) 94, the Court found that "arbitrators, at least those under British Columbia's
labour relations legislation, are bound by the Charter." However, the success of a Charter
argument would likely depend on the particular labour relations legislation involved. It is not
within the scope of this paper to explore fully whether a labour arbitrator's orders will
necessarily be subject to the Charter, however it is important to note this possibility. This paper
focuses on the decision-making process at the arbitration level (dealing with the employment
relationship between the university and the professor), and does not examine this question of
potential judicial review.
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ment, and those where a "special plan" lays out the understandings and
obligations of the university and the individual faculty employee. 0
a. Collective Agreements
Where a collective agreement governs the employment relationship, the
union (often called the Faculty Association) represents the professors in
negotiation with the university. Many of the employer's actions towards
the professor (such as discipline or denial of tenure) are restricted by the
collective agreement and subject to grievance arbitration before an
arbitrator in accordance with provincial labour law. As described by
Christie and Mullan:
In a collective bargaining relationship the duties and obligations of the
university and the faculty members are those set out in the collective
agreement, which will be a single document except where it has been
specifically amended by the parties or elaborated through letters of
understanding, which are technically part of the collective agreement. The
collective agreement will be interpreted by labour arbitrators with refer-
ence to an established jurisprudence of labour arbitration, and the tradition
of labour arbitration would suggest greater sympathy to the customs and
practice of the particular employment situation than would normally be
found in the courts. 31
The notion of unique customs and practices is an important part of the
collective bargaining relationship. As Christie and Mullan explain, this
does not mean that "the formality and precision of the collective agree-
ment should or will give way in the face of evidence of a different pre-
certification approach", but that "with sensitive arbitrators a 'common
law of academe' may emerge to which reference may be had where the
collective agreement is 'open' or ambiguous. '32 This may be particularly
relevant where academic freedom clauses are ambiguous, and may
require the labour arbitrator to go beyond the wording of the text to
consider the exact nature of the parties' intention.
A labour arbitrator has the authority to settle any difference between
the parties, whether arising from the "interpretation, application, admin-
30. The phrase "special plan" is widely used in literature describing these sorts of Faculty
Association arrangements. As Christie and Mullan explain, it is "a phrase coined originally at
U.B.C. apparently, and now widely used by the CAUT in its official literature": I. Christie &
D.J. Mullan, "Canadian Academic Tenure and Employment: An Uncertain Future?" (1982) 7
Dalhousie L.J. 72 at 72.
31. Ibid. at 92-3 [emphasis added].
32. Ibid. at 93 [emphasis added].
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istration or alleged violation of the [collective] agreement."33 If the
university were to take disciplinary action against a professor that was
subject to grievance arbitration, the Faculty Association might submit
that the university had breached the academic freedom guarantee so that
the collective agreement clause protecting this right should be consid-
ered. In addition to having the jurisdiction to interpret the collective
agreement, labour arbitrators must also consider the relevant obligations
under human rights legislation. In some provinces labour codes specifi-
cally give jurisdiction to arbitrators to consider human rights standards in
coming to a decision. 34 Even where this is not explicit in the statute, the
case law indicates that the parties cannot, by virtue of their collective
agreement, contract out of any obligations owed under human rights
legislation. 35
33. This language is from s. 48(1) of the Labour Relations Act 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1, but is
typical of arbitration clauses in provincial labour relations statutes. If a collective agreement
does not expressly include a clause for binding arbitration, it is deemed to be included: Labour
Relations Act 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1, s. 48(2). See Brown & Beatty, supra note 29 at 2-1: "an
arbitrator's jurisdiction is derived primarily from the collective agreement and submission to
arbitration, and in most provinces in Canada, is founded in the legislative requirement that
collective agreements contain an arbitration clause .. "
34. For example the B.C. Labour Relations Code, S.B.C. 1992, c. 82, s. 89 reads:
(89) [Flor the purposes set out in section 82 an arbitration board has the authority
necessary to provide a final and conclusive settlement of a dispute arising under a
collective agreement, and without limitation, may...
(g) interpret and apply an Act intended to regulate the employment relationship of
the persons bound by a collective agreement despite that the Act's provisions
conflict with the terms of the collective agreement.
Similarly, the Nova Scotia Trade Union Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 475 s. 43(1)(e) states that:
43(1) An arbitrator or an arbitration board appointed pursuant to this Act or to a collective
agreement...
(e) has power to treat as part of the collective agreement the provisions of any
statute of the Province governing relations between the parties to the collective
agreement.
The Ontario Labour Relations Act 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1, s. 48(12)(j) is more specific. It says
(12)... an arbitrator or an arbitration board as the case may be has power...
(j) to interpret and apply human rights and other employment-related statutes,
despite any conflict between those statutes and the terms of the collective
agreement. [emphasis added]
35. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. Etobicoke (Borough), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 202, 132
D.L.R. (3d) 14 [hereinafter Etobicoke]. More recently in Newfoundland Association of Public
Employees v. Newfoundland (Green Bay Health Care Centre), 11996] 2 S.C.R. 3, 134 D.L.R.
(4th) 1 [hereinafter Green Bay], the Court further refined this rule, holding that parties cannot
contract below the threshold of rights allowed under human rights legislation. Therefore,
parties can only contract for more human rights protection than would be afforded by the statue
alone.
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b. Special Plans
Where faculty have not entered into collective agreements a special plan
arrangement often governs the employment relationship.36 Special plans
constitute a sort of middle ground between collective bargaining and the
individual contract of employment. As Christie and Mullan explain:
[Elssentially the Faculty Association negotiates a "structural" agreement
with the university which contains many of the non-monetary aspects of
the standard collective agreement. The agreement also provides for the
annual negotiation of salary and benefits, with some form of arbitration
replacing the right to strike in the event of an impasse at the bargaining
table.
3 7
Because faculty under special plans cannot access the protection of the
provincial labour relations regime38 the key question is how the rights in
the special plan are enforced. As Christie and Mullan point out, "the right
of an individual faculty member to enforce the terms of a 'special plan'
in the courts is dependent on whether or not its terms can be said to be
incorporated into his private contract of employment."39 In some cases,
this is made clear by an express clause in the employment contract. 40
There may be greater debate about whether a special plan can be said to
be incorporated by implication into the individual professor's contract of
employment.4" Special plan situations do, however, appear to have
survived the few legal challenges that have been launched, and remain in
36. For a discussion of the historical origins and development of the "special plan"
mechanism, see Christie & Mullan, supra note 30. Generally, special plans arose in some
provinces because of legislation that excluded faculty from collective bargaining legislation.
In other situations faculty have never been prevented from unionizing but have chosen special
plans instead (the University of Toronto is a prominent example).
37. Ibid. at 97.
38. For example the right to collective representation, or the right to take strike action.
39. Christie & Mullan, supra note 30 at 97.
40. An example of such an express clause is found in the Christie and Mullan article, ibid.
at 86: "All the provisions, terms and conditions set forth in Part I of The University of Alberta
Handbook as amended from time to time shall apply to and be treated as part of the contract
of appointment. A copy of the Handbook is enclosed herewith and should be read carefully."
41. In Wheeldon v. Simon Fraser University (1970), 15 D.L.R. (3d) 641 (B.C.S.C.) [herein-
after Wheeldon], a "'statement on academic freedom and tenure.., considered acceptable by
the acting President of the University and accepted by a referendum of the faculty members was
held not to be incorporated in the [professor]'s contract of employment": Christie & Mullan,
ibid. at 87. However, Christie and Mullan argue that this case may be confined to its unique facts
(the tenure statement was adopted after the professor was employed, and so the case was not
so simple as where "a particular known document was to be treated as incorporated into a new
employee's contract", ibid. at 87.) Further, Christie and Mullan assert, at 87, that the conclusion
in Wheeldon "is contrary ... to the readiness of the courts in employment cases generally to
treat the relevant documents as incorporated."
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place in some universities instead of collective bargaining.42 Although
the matter of implied inclusion may not have been unequivocally re-
solved, according to available case law, courts routinely seem to accept
that the special plans have been incorporated into faculty employment
contracts .
43
Special plans have many similarities to the collective agreement in the
university setting. Often a document such as a "Faculty Agreement" or
"Terms of Appointment Document" will lay out the agreed upon terms
of employment. These also often include an academic freedom clause. As
well, they tend to contain a clause governing discipline and the right to
arbitral review of that discipline.' It is the decision-making process in
these arbitral fora that will be considered in this paper. The arbitrator
under a special plan, like a labour arbitrator, would have to consider the
exact scope and content of the academic freedom clause in the employ-
ment agreement in order to adjudicate the conflict between the professor
and the university.
Thejurisdiction of the special plan arbitrator is normally defined in the
agreement. This generally includes the jurisdiction to interpret whether
discipline has been meted out in accordance with the agreed upon terms
42. For example, Dyck v. University of Toronto (1983), 44 O.R. (2d) 317, 4 D.L.R. (4th) 62
(H.C.J.) where the court held that the Governing Council of the University of Toronto did have
the power to enter into a special plan agreement with Faculty Association for binding
arbitration of salaries and benefits of faculty and librarians. The case does not necessarily
answer other questions about the legality of special plans (for example whether a plan can said
to be an implied term of employment), rather it was limited to the rather narrow question of
whether the university could delegate its power over fixing salaries and benefits to an arbitrator.
43. For example in Bareau v. University ofAlberta (1995), 177 A.R. 121 (Q.B.), a professor
who was terminated by the University exercised his right to arbitration under a "special plan"
arrangement. When the arbitration board upheld the discipline, the professor sought judicial
review in the Court of Queen's Bench. In describing the special plan, Phillips J., referred to the
Faculty Agreement, at para 7, as "the governing document which sets out the understandings
and responsibilities the academic staff and University have with and to each other."
In another case, Rennie v. University of Victoria, [1996] B.C.J. No. 1069 (B.C.S.C.)
(Q.L.), the court said at para. 6:
at all times material the petitioner was operating as Assistant to the Dean of Faculty of
Law and was a party to a contractual arrangement entered into by the Board of
Governors, University of Victoria, and the Professional Staff Association (PSA). As a
result of negotiations between the Board of Governors and the PSA, the Terms of
Appointment of Administrative and Academic Professional Employees (TOAD)
document was created and is binding on the University and the employees. [emphasis
added]
It is important to note that both these cases were brought in the name of the individual
employee. This reflects the legal status of special plans, as it is the individual employee who
actually enforces the terms of the plan with the university, rather than the union, as under a
collective agreement.
44. Under a special plan the method of dispute arbitration could be by internal committee, or
by recourse to an outside arbitrator, but would depend on the contents of the agreement itself.
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in the special plan.45 Some special plans incorporate by reference an
outside statute (such as a provincial arbitration statute) to govern the rules
of arbitration, which would further delineate the jurisdiction of the
arbitrator. For example the Ontario Arbitration Act (which is incorpo-
rated into certain special plans) provides that "[an arbitrator] shall decide
the dispute in accordance with the arbitration agreement ... under which
the dispute arose, and may also take into account any applicable usages
of trade.146
Special plans do not entitle faculty to exactly the same guarantees and
mechanisms available underprovincial labourrelations legislation. How-
ever, most often they do include clauses protecting academic freedom,
and allow for some form of arbitration when the agreement has allegedly
been breached. In this way, arbitration under the special plan will include
many of the same considerations as before a labour arbitrator. It is not
possible to canvass all of the nuances of the different arrangements at
Canadian universities within the scope of this paper. However, the
considerations at both of these sorts of arbitrations (trade union and non-
trade union) are similar enough to bear a common analysis.47 However,
it should be noted that there may be a difference between special plan
arrangements and collective agreements in the way that each would be
dealt with by a reviewing court.4
s
c. Tenure
Tenure is a unique aspect of the faculty employment arrangement and is
relevant to academic freedom. Tenure is generally accepted as meaning
that after a certain probationary period professors are granted a status
whereby they have enhanced employment security compared to non-
tenured faculty. The President of the Ontario Confederation of University
Faculty Associations has described tenure as
45. Again, this would depend on the terms of the particular special plan.
46. Arbitration Act, S.O. 1991, c. 17, s. 33 [emphasis added].
47. Specifically, this analysis will focus on the content and scope of academic freedom
clauses at Canadian universities. This includes how academic freedom clauses should be
applied to different factual situations involving the classroom. In fact, an arbitrator involved
in a grievance arbitration over a "special plan" would likely apply many of the same concepts
of arbitral jurisprudence as in the labour context.
48. One difference between collective agreements and special plans may be the possible
Charter review of an arbitrator's order. There may be a possibility that a labour arbitrator under
a collective agreement could be considered statutorily appointed, and therefore a government
actor. See discussion supra note 29. However, with a special plan there is no similar link to
government (such as with provincial labour relations statutes) and so if judicial review were
sought there would likely be no possibility of Charter review of an arbitrator's order under a
special plan.
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a status granted to those professors who have demonstrated excellence in
their particular fields after a five to seven year probationary period ...
[T]enure does not protect those who neglect their duties. It protects the
right of professors to pursue research in what may be unpopular areas and
publish their findings free from fear of reprisal from governments, corpo-
rations, or other interests.
49
Similarly, the Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT) has
described tenure as "permanency of appointment, the right of a faculty
member not to be dismissed except for cause. '"50
Tenure has also been described as an essential mechanism to protect
academic freedom, for example by the Supreme Court of Canada in
McKinney.5 While the importance of tenure is endorsed in collective
agreements and special plans, there are also limits. As one author argues,
nearly 85 percent of collective agreements in Canada's universities have
had program redundancy and financial stringency clauses, making it
possible to revoke tenure when necessary. Second, these same agreements
explicitly give power to university management to fire tenuredfaculty for
neglect of duties and incompetence. Tenure does not mean an academic
cannot be fired.52
Therefore, tenure should not be viewed as insulating faculty from any
discipline or review, although the standard of misconduct required for
discipline may be higher than for non-tenured faculty (for example
requiring neglect of duty, incompetence, or gross misconduct). 3
49. Emily F. Carasco, President of OCUFA, quoted in P.C. Emberley, Zero Tolerance: Hot
Button Politics in Canada's Universities (Toronto: Penguin, 1996) at 63.
50. "Policy Statement on Academic Appointments and Tenure", in CA UT Handbook, supra
note 4, cl. 2.7 at 10.
51. Supra note 28, where the Court said:
The policy of tenure in university faculties is fundamental to the preservation of
academic freedom. Once tenure is granted it provides a truly free and innovative
learning and research environment. Tenure provides the necessary academic freedom
to allow free and fearless search for knowledge and the propagation of ideas....
[Faculty] must have a great measure of security of employment if they are to have the
freedom necessary to the maintenance of academic excellence which is or should be the
hallmark of a University.
52. Emberley, supra note 49 at 71-2 [emphasis added]. Emberley does note that despite this
formal power, University administrators may face great obstacles in attempting to terminate
tenured faculty, due to the higher standard of misconduct that is required.
53. Depending on the wording used in the particular collective agreement or special plan.
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2. Academic Freedom: What Have the Parties Agreed To?
a. Content of the Clauses
It is clear that most faculty have contracted for some sort academic
freedom protection. What is less clear is the extent of that protection. It
is difficult to definitively outline academic freedom protection in Cana-
dian collective agreements and special plans. There are over forty-eight
collective agreements and plans between universities and professors in
Canada, employing a variety of wording. However, there is a constant
thread running through many agreements: a reflection of the four indicia
which were laid out in an American document, the 1940 Statement of
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure. 4 That document identi-
fied the "four pillars" of academic freedom as:
(a) the right to teach without adherence to any prescribed doctrine
(provided that one dealt with the subject matter in the senate-approved
course outline);
(b) the right to research without reference to prescribed doctrine;
(c) the right to make public the results of one's research; and
(d) the right to speak extramurally which includes the right to criticize the
government of the day or the administration of one's institution.
5
While the specific language of special plans and collective agreements
may vary, many of them expressly indicate that academic freedom
includes these rights.5 6
b. Limits to Academic Freedom Within the Employment Agreement
In addition to the affirmed commitment to academic freedom under the
collective agreement or special plan, there are also limits on what the
concept covers. These limits may be due to implied or explicit obligations
in the text of the agreements themselves, or because of outside legal
obligations.
54. The document is a joint statement by the AAUP (American Association of University
Professors) and the AAC (Association of American Colleges).
55. Summarized in Gillespie, supra note 5 at 243 [emphasis added].
56. A typical example is the Mount Allison University Faculty Association Collective
Agreement (1 May 1992 - 30 June 1995), art. 9.01: "the parties agree that faculty members and
librarians are entitled.., regardless of prescribed doctrine, to freedom in intellectual pursuits;
freedom in carrying out research and publishing the results thereof; freedom in teaching and
discussion; freedom to criticize the Employer and the Union; and freedom from institutional
censorship." Very similar wording is used in the Trent University Faculty Association
Collective Agreement (1 July 1993 - 30 June 1996), art. 1.2.3; and the Dalhousie University
Faculty Association Collective Agreement (1 May 1991 -30 June 1993), as well as many others
throughout Canada.
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Many agreements include language that limits the academic freedom
right, so that it cannot be said to be absolute. For example many collective
agreements and special plans include an explicit clause affirming the
professor's duty to use the freedom reasonably and in a responsible
way.57 In one Canadian case, the "Vedanand grievance",58 the labour
arbitrator heard expert evidence from the executive vice-president of the
Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada (AUCC) who stated:
A review of some forty-eight collective agreements and academic staff
manuals indicated that twenty Canadian universities specifically provide
that academic freedom has a corresponding obligation to use the freedom
in a responsible manner. 9
There has been little jurisprudence defining the reasonableness limita-
tion. Therefore, the extent of the academic freedom provision, and what
will constitute "reasonable or responsible" behaviour will be left to
arbitrators in future cases.60
Even where there is no explicit reasonable limitation clause in the
agreement, there is an argument that academic freedom impliedly in-
cludes a duty on professors to act reasonably. When an arbitrator
interprets an agreement, he or she is asked to consider the meaning of
57. Some examples of this language include:
(a) the collective agreement from Dalhousie University, art. 3.01: "The parties agree
that academic freedom carries with it a corresponding responsibility on the part of
Members to use their freedom responsibly, with due concern for the rights of others
... and for the welfare of society";
(b) Memorial University of Newfoundland, cl. 2.05: "In exercising the freedom to
comment and criticise, Academic Staff Members have a corresponding obligation
to use academic freedom in a responsible manner by recognizing the rights of other
members of the University community, and by affirming the rights of others to hold
differing points of view"; and
(c) University of Winnipeg agreement, art. 7.02: "[Academic freedom] ... implies a
respect for the rights of others, a tolerance of other points of view and a duty to use
academic freedom in a responsible manner". [emphasis added]
58. University ofManitoba v. University ofManitoba FacultyAssociation (1991) (Vedanand
Grievance) (Arbitrator Schulman) [unreported] [hereinafter "Vedanand grievance"]. The case
arose from an incident at a Management Faculty function. The department had invited
members of the Xerox company to the party (who the University hoped would continue to give
financial support to the department). At the function, Professor Vedanand, a Professor in the
faculty interrupted a presentation put on by the Xerox representative, and challenged him on
his information. Ultimately the head of the department sent Prof. Vedanand a letter informing
him his behaviour was not in the best interests of the department. The Faculty Association
grieved the letter on the basis that it infringed academic freedom. The case is useful because
the arbitrator was faced with determining whether the behaviour fit within the accepted
confines of academic freedom. To determine this, he reviewed some of the historical and
philosophical parameters of the concept, and ultimately found that academic freedom was not
broad enough to include the facts of the particular case.
59. Ibid. at 58.
60. The approach that an arbitrator should take in considering "reasonableness" or "respon-
sibility" will be taken up later in this paper.
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particular words. The term "Academic Freedom" is used in many
agreements without a definition of its actual content or meaning.
6
'
Therefore, the arbitrator may consider extrinsic evidence to support a
particular argument about what the parties meant when they included the
term Academic Freedom in their agreement. 62 This would depend on
showing the particular historical, or commonly understood meaning of
the term within the academic community.
The idea that academic freedom does not grant absolute license, but
involves some duty to use the right responsibly is commonly reflected in
sources that describe the concept. Notably, the CAUT (which represents
the interests of professors) has agreed in its policy statement on tenure
appointments that "[a]cademic freedom is not ... absolute any more than
the freedom enjoyed by other citizens in a democracy is absolute. It must
be exercised with responsibility and appropriate restraint.'' 63 In addi-
tion, one of the founding academic freedom documents, the 1940 State-
ment of Principles (from which the "four pillars" of academic freedom are
drawn) refers to "correlative duties" that accompany academic freedom
rights.64 Therefore, there is a strong argument to be made that the
commonly understood interpretation (or the "trade usage") of the term
61. The term "Academic Freedom" is used throughout agreements, but never thoroughly
defined. Even when agreements list some of the actual freedoms that are protected, such as the
agreements listed in supra note 56, they do not answer all the questions about the contents of
academic freedom. For example, many agreements state that academic freedom includes the
"four pillars" from the 1940 Statement offPrinciples, supra note 54 (the right to teach, the right
to research, the right to make public the results of one's research, the right to speak
extramurally). Although this enumerates the broad categories of activity that are covered by
academic freedom, it does not answer other questions about what academic freedom includes,
and certainly does not tell us what is excluded.
62. Brown & Beatty, supra note 29 at 4-40, summarize "where a word or phrase in issue is
alleged to have been used in a trade sense or have a special technical meaning, evidence of the
trade, custom or special meaning may be adduced" (citing Re St. John's Shipping Assn. Ltd.
and International Longshoremen's Assn., Loc. 1593 (1973), 3 L.A.C. (2d) 316 (Harris); and
Re General Truck Drivers Union, Loc. 938, and Charlon TransportLtd. (1968), 19L.A.C. 31
(Pyle)), and "collective agreements are not negotiated in a vacuum, but rather are settled in the
context of general industrial relations practices."
63. CAUT, University Tenured Appointments and Their Purpose (Ottawa: CAUT, Septem-
ber, 1991) at clause 3 [emphasis added].
64. In the "Vedanand grievance", supra note 58, the arbitrator conducted an extensive review
of the historical meaning of academic freedom, including hearing from expert witnesses. He
pointed out that the CAUT "Model Clause on Academic Freedom", supra note 4, "is deficient
in that it omits to delineate the limitations of academic freedom in the manner of earlier
American statements", "Vedanand grievance", supra note 58 at 57 [emphasis added]. In fact,
the 1940 Statement of Principles, supra note 54, states that "teachers ... should be careful not
to introduce into their teaching controversial matter which has no relation to their subject", and
that academic freedom in teaching "carries with it duties correlative with ights." In the
"Vedanand grievance" itself the arbitrator did not need to find an implied "reasonableness
limitation", as one was included explicitly in the agreement.
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"Academic Freedom" includes a correlative obligation to exercise it
responsibility, and this is what the parties intended when they included
the phrase.
65
In addition to the question of reasonableness, academic freedom is
limited by the requirement that it be used to pursue valid academic
objectives. The expert evidence in the "Vedanand grievance" under-
scored this.
Of the 28 collective agreements or staff manuals defining academic
freedom but not specifying that the academic freedom must be exercised
reasonably, it would appear to be implied that academic freedom is related
to the expression of opinion or dissemination of knowledge which flows
from the research and the pursuit of knowledge.6
The CAUT has agreed that academic freedom is premised on "the duty
to use [the] freedom in a manner consistent with the scholarly obligations
to base research and teaching on an honest search for knowledge. 67
Another professorial duty that limits the content of the academic
freedom clause is the obligation to fulfil the conditions of employment
competently. In terms of the teaching, this means that a minimum
threshold of conduct is acceptable in discharging the requirements of
office. The university's right to discipline the professor for classroom
conduct is not uniquely restricted to discrimination cases. As one author
states, "[a]cademic freedom is not seen as protecting faculty from
dismissal on the grounds of incompetence, moral turpitude, or neglect of
duty. '68 For example, "academic freedom does not convey a right to
teach any subject one wants. '69 In fact, creating a poisoned environment
may be viewed simply as one form of misconduct or incompetence.7"
65. It should be bome in mind that if the professor's conduct in the classroom is serious
enough, this distinction (whether there is an implied obligation to act reasonably) may be of
little practical significance. The obligation under human rights legislation not to discriminate
would still represent an automatic limitation to the academic freedom right, regardless of
whether or not there is a duty to act reasonably.
66. "Vedanand grievance", supra note 58 at 58 [emphasis added].
67. This is the description of academic freedom used in the "Model Clause on Academic
Freedom", supra note 4 at 4. Given that the CAUT represents faculty interests, and the witness
in the "Vedanand grievance" represented the AUCC (Association of Universities and Colleges
of Canada) there would appear to be consensus on this particular issue between both sides
(faculty and university administration). Similar wording to the CAUT description of the "duty"
appears in many agreements.
68. Ontario Council on University Affairs Task Force on Resource Allocation, Background
Paper: Some Perspectives on Academic Freedom, Autonomy and Accountability (Toronto:
Ontario Council on University Affairs, 1996) at 6.
69. Ibid.
70. "Racist and sexist professors can be dealt with in the same manner as other professors who
fail to discharge their professional obligations, for different reasons": B. Shrank "Academic
Freedom and University Speech Codes" (1994) 44 U.N.B. L.J. 67 at 71.
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Certainly, as will be discussed later in this paper, the university may
demand certain standards from its professors in the classroom, whether
related to discrimination or not.
In addition to these more universally included limits, some collective
agreements and special plans include specific limitations on discrimina-
tory behaviour. These may be separate from the academic freedom
clauses themselves, but nonetheless could serve to limit their scope. An
example of a broadly worded clause is found in the Trent University
Collective Agreement:
[T]he parties to this agreement are committed to creating and maintaining
a working and learning environment that supports scholarship and the fair
treatment of all members of the University community. The parties shall
not accept behaviour that undermines the dignity, self-esteem, safety or
productivity of any member of the University community. Discrimination
and/or harassment violate the fundamental rights, personal dignity, per-
sonal integrity and/or are a violation of academic freedom.7
A clause like this one would be broad enough to ascribe to the professor
an agreed upon obligation towards his or her students.
72
c. Limitations Outside the Collective Agreement
In addition to internal limitations, collective agreement rights cannot be
interpreted without reference to outside legal obligations.73 It is well
settled that a collective agreement cannot purport to contract the parties
out of existing legal duties under human rights legislation, unless it is to
guarantee a higher level of protection than under human rights legisla-
tion.74 Further, an employer may properly discipline an employee who
71. Trent Collective Agreement 1993, article 1.2.4.3, as cited in Gillespie, supra note 5 at 237
[emphasis added]. Interestingly, as Gillespie points out, it was a group of professors at Trent
university who promulgated the "Right to Offend" document. In making their argument, the
authors cited the collective agreement provision protecting academic freedom, but failed to
mention this broad competing obligation in the collective agreement. This exemplifies the way
in which academic freedom absolutists have failed to consider their competing obligations,
particularly to the student.
72. Not all anti-discrimination clauses are as broad. Some may provide protection only to "the
parties" to the agreement (the University and the employee, or the Faculty Association) rather
than extending the protection to "any member of the University community" such as in the
Trent agreement. This would not change the obligation owed to the student by the professor
and the university under the statutory human rights standard, however.
73. Examples of outside legal obligations include human rights legislation and criminal code
provisions against the promotion of hatred. In this paper the discussion will be limited to the
human rights statute standard, which covers a broader category of cases and does not require
the same proof of intent as with a criminal code provision. This makes it the more likely avenue
of complaint for a student challenging a professor's conduct.
74. Etobicoke & Green Bay, both supra note 35.
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discharges his obligations of employment in such a way as to violate
human rights law.7 5 In fact the CAUT (which advocates liberal, but not
absolute protection for academic freedom) agrees that the professor's
right must be limited by his or her legal obligations, including those under
human rights legislation.76 This makes the existing jurisprudence on
human rights and discrimination extremely important in identifying the
content of academic freedom in the classroom.
If a professor's conduct within the classroom were to constitute
"discrimination" (as that term has been defined in the case law) it would
appear that some action would be required by the university. If discrimi-
nation in the classroom were shown, then discipline would almost surely
be merited. This would be based on the faculty member's failure to
discharge his or her professional obligations.77 Certainly outside of the
specific university context, there is arbitral jurisprudence which makes
clear that an employee may deserve discipline based on harassing or
75. See for example Re Wentworth County Board of Education and Canadian Union of
Public Employees, Loc. 1572(1984), 14 L.A.C. (3d) 310 (Devlin), where the arbitrator said that
the parties could not have intended for either party to carry out its rights and obligations in a
manner contrary to public policy. In fact, as Brown & Beatty, supra note 29 at 2-48, point out
"it is now clearly established that where the provisions of a collective agreement are clearly
contrary to a statute, the arbitrator is to treat that portion of the agreement as null and void."
Further, Brown & Beatty also point out, at 2-49, that in McLeod v. Egan, [ 1975] 1 S.C.R. 517,
46 D.L.R. (3d) 150, the Supreme Court of Canada made clear that "an arbitrator has not only
the authority but also a responsibility to interpret and apply [relevant] legislation."
76. For example the CAUT has officially said "human rights law clearly makes illegal racial
or sexual threats, intimidation, violence or assaults by faculty directed against students or other
members of the academic community. .. . In this sense it limits certain forms of speech.
Academic freedom cannot be invoked to justify such behaviour": Reply, supra note 7 at 8. The
CAUT agrees that the university is "justified in forbidding, through fair procedures, behaviour
in the classroom which creates a persistently degrading and intimidating environment based
on race, sex, or sexual orientation" [this list was based on Ontario legislation], ibid.
77. This approach is supported in an article by a former chair of CAUT's Academic Freedom
and Tenure Committee. Bernice Shrank, supra note 3 at 10, writes "a faculty member who
persistently allows offensive or sexist racist stereotypes or racial epithets in the classroom fails
to provide an academic environment conducive to learning. Surely, such a failure ought to be
dealt with in the same manner as otherfailures to discharge one's Professional obligations. ...
Provided that the discipline is reasonably applied and subject to grievance and arbitration
provisions, there is no reason why disciplinary action should not be taken by university
administrators in cases which they judge that colleagues, by their conduct, verbal and
otherwise, have abused their positions in the classroom" [emphasis added]. The CAUT agrees
that where a professor has "systematically denigrate[d]" students on a protected ground, he or
she will have "create[d] an environment 'in which the equal ability of students to learn is
obstructed'." Further "this would not be professional behaviour on the part of the professor and
could reasonably be sanctioned by the employer": Gillespie, supra note 5 at 247.
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unprofessional conduct to a "third party" (that is someone using the
employer's service such as a college student or bus passenger).7"
In summary then, it is fair to say that all Canadian professors have the
following obligations which may limit academic freedom in the class-
room: 9 to teach without creating a poisoned environment, to teach
competently, and to use the freedom in a manner consistent with scholarly
obligation to base research and teaching on an honest search for knowl-
edge. Further, if the collective agreement or special plan includes a clause
demanding the responsible use of academic freedom, then this limitation
will also be clear. If the clause is not explicit, then it is likely the limitation
does exist, but would be up to an arbitrator to decide. These limitations
are rarely, if ever, discussed in the absolutist academic freedom position.
The "right to offend" platform, for example, relies only on collective
agreement sections that afford academic freedom rights, but ignores the
anti-discrimination section. This is not an accurate depiction of what the
parties have agreed upon in the employment contract.
In order to prevent harassment and to fulfil their own legal obligations,
many Canadian universities have adopted formal harassment policies
and mechanisms for complaint resolution. For the most part these policies
reflect existing human rights obligations, but provide students with an
alternative means of lodging a complaint about a professor's classroom
conduct. It may well be that information arising from one of these internal
adjudication bodies would lead the university to discipline a professor,
thus setting off the arbitration process.8" This process may proceed
simultaneously with grievance arbitration. Further, a professor may face
individual sanction from a human rights commission for classroom
conduct. This may be independent of any disciplinary sanction imposed
by the university. Therefore, it is quite possible that a professor could
simultaneously be the subject of grievance arbitration and internal and
external harassment complaints arising out of the same events (the
allegation of discrimination in the classroom).
78. See for example Re Vancouver Community College and Vancouver Community College
Faculty Assn. (1994), 46 L.A.C. (4th) 72 (Thompson) where the grievor was properly
disciplined for abusive conduct towards a student, and Re Public Utilities Commission of City
of Brantford and Amalgamated Transit Union, Div. 685 (1991), 22 L.A.C. (4th) 326 (Verity,
Ward, Clarkson), where a bus driver sexually harassed a woman passenger and was discharged.
79. In reality, if an arbitrator were considering the conduct of a professor who created a
"poisoned" climate in the classroom, there would likely be overlap between these different
"duties" or limitations. For example, conduct might be worthy of discipline because it breaches
the obligation to act responsibly, or it breaches the human rights standard, or both.
80. A thorough analysis of harassment codes on campuses is beyond the scope of this paper.
For such a discussion, see Gillespie, supra note 5; and J. Kilcoyne, "The Politics of Policies:
Responding to Sexual Harassment on Campus" (1995) 3 C.L.E.L.J. 33.
102 The Dalhousie Law Journal
III. The Legal Relationship Between the University/Professor
and the Student
Clearly the university and the professor owe each other particular legal
obligations under the employment contract. However, this is complicated
somewhat by the legal obligations owed to another group: students. The
student's role as "third party" must be considered in any discussion of the
professor's employment obligations. The most controversial of these
obligations has been the argument that the professor (and the university)
must provide a classroom that is free from discrimination, and in
particular is not "poisoned" or "hostile" on a ground protected by human
rights legislation. In addition to legal arguments, there are compelling
moral and philosophical arguments for imposing this duty on the profes-
sor. It is also critical to discern what the poisoned climate test should and
should not include, in order to counter the alarmist "slippery slope"
arguments that have been raised by academic freedom "absolutists."
1. The Legal Argument for the Use of the Poisoned Climate Test
In Berg v. University of British Columbia the Supreme Court of Canada
affirmed that the provision of education in the university classroom falls
within the realm of a "service" for human rights purposes.81 The majority
said:
I would conclude that generally, the natures of the service-provider
[university] and the service-user students in this case indicate a very public
relationship with respect to ordinary educational services (such as the
provision of instructors, testing and grading).2
If the university and the professor are obligated to provide classroom
services free of "discrimination" the obvious question is what is included
within the definition of that term. The seminal case in Canadian law is
Janzen v. Platy Enterprises.83 In that case the Supreme Court concluded
81. Berg v. University of British Columbia, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 353, 102 D.L.R. (4th) 665
[hereinafter Berg cited to S.C.R.]. That case dealt with the British Columbia Human Rights Act,
S.B.C. 1984, c. 22, which prohibited discrimination "in the provision of a service customarily
available to the public" [emphasis added]. The issue of whether university service was a
"public" service was a key issue in the Berg case. The case has the most relevance for
jurisdictions where human rights legislation refer to services "available to the public." In
jurisdictions with more general clauses regarding the provision of service (such as Ontario
where the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H-19, s. 1, reads: "every person has the right
to equal treatment with respect to services..) there is no issue over what is a "public" service
and so Berg has less bearing. However, even where the legislation is more general, Berg is still
useful in that it affirms that "the provision of instructors, testing and grading" are "ordinary
educational services" and are subject to the human rights statutes.
82. Ibid. at 387 [emphasis added].
83. Supra note 14.
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that "discrimination" on the basis of gender in human rights statutes
included sexual harassment. Further, the court concluded that sexual
harassment is not limited to the so-called "quid pro quo" category, but
rather, includes the creation of a "hostile environment" based on gender.
The court in Janzen considered a legislative provision that used the
general term "discrimination" but made no mention of the more specific
term "sexual harassment." 4 The Court's reading of the term "discrimi-
nation", therefore, can presumably be applied to all provincial human
rights statutes that use this more general term. Some human rights statutes
also include more specific protection against "sexual harassment", al-
though only in particular sections." It is unlikely that this will make any
difference to the way that the more general "discrimination" sections will
be interpreted, given the established legal principles around human rights
law." Therefore, the poisoned climate test should likely be read-in
wherever there is protection against discrimination.
While Janzen delineated the law for harassment based on gender, it did
not speak to other categories protected under human rights legislation.
Subsequent case law has demonstrated that the creation of a poisoned
environment is not limited to gender discrimination, but could be based
84. The case was based on s.6(1) of Manitoba's The Human RightsAct, S.M. 1974, c. 65 [now
R.S.M. 1987, c. H175, s. 6(1)], which at the time included general protection against
discrimination in employment, but not specific protection against sexual harassment.
85. The Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H-19, s. 7(2), for example provides
specific protection against harassment, but only in the context of employment. The section
covering the provision of services, see s. 1, (that would be relevant to the university classroom)
uses the more general term "discrimination."
86. The Supreme Court's articulation of the meaning of discrimination in Janzen is "presum-
ably the case not only where legislation does not define 'sexual harassment', but also where
it does, on the view that ajurisdiction should not be able to confer less protection by offering
it explicitly than by offering it indirectly, except where the Legislature has clearly spoken
otherwise": P. Hughes, "The Evolving Concept of Sexual Harassment" (1995) 3 C.L.E.L.J. 14
at 14). In Winnipeg SchoolDivision No. I v. Craton, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 150at 156,21 D.L.R. (4th)
1, the Supreme Court of Canada said "[human rights legislation] is... of such a nature that it
may not be altered, amended or repealed, nor may exceptions be created to its provisions, save
by clear legislative pronouncement." There is nothing to indicate that by including harassment
specifically in the section of the Human Rights Code covering employment, but not in the
section covering the provision of services, the Ontario legislature intended to exempt the latter
section from the decision in Janzen. This reading of the legislation is supported by Noffle v.
McClaskin Hot House (1989), 11 C.H.R.R. D/407 at D/408, 90 C.L.L.C. 17,013 (Ont. Bd. of
Inquiry) where the adjudicator said that afterJanzen "it may no longer be correct to assume that
sexual harassment in Ontario begins and ends with s. 6 [now s. 7] of the Code. The Supreme
Court of Canada's dicta appear to take a broader approach to sexual harassment than the
provisions under s. 6 [now 7]." Further, the Supreme Court has clearly stated that exceptions
to human rights legislation should be read narrowly, and that the legislation should always be
read broadly to give full effect to its important purpose; see supra note 26. A narrow, restrictive
reading of the Ontario Code (especially in the absence of legislative intent) would not be
consistent with this precept.
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on other personal characteristics that are enumerated in the legislation,
such as race. 7 Recently, in Ross v. New Brunswick School District No.
15 the Supreme Court considered a poisoned environment based on anti-
Semitism.5 Given the way the poisoned environment has been expanded
to cases involving racial and religious harassment, it seems likely that the
university would be obligated to provide its service free from harassment
based on other characteristics enumerated in the relevant provincial
legislation also. 9
The university has a positive legal obligation to take effective steps to
end the harassing behaviour of its employees, and to provide its service
free of discrimination. As the professor's employer, the university is
certainly responsible for ensuring that it provides a discrimination-free
environment for fellow employees.90 This onus on the university will
likely also extend to the provision of educational service to students. The
Supreme Court laid out the premise for the rule in Robichaud when it said:
[the employer's liability] serves a purpose somewhat similar to that of
vicarious liability in tort, by placing responsibility for an organization on
those who control it and are in a position to take effective remedial action
to remove undesirable conditions."
As John Kilcoyne points out,
on similar reasoning, university administrators, by virtue of their authority
over the campus and its inhabitants, will also be responsible since they are
87. In L. McDowell, Human Rights in the Workplace: A Practical Guide (Toronto: Carswell,
1995) at 5-18, Lori McDowell explains "harassment on the basis of any of the terms making
up racial discrimination, including one's race, colour, ancestry, nationality, ethnic background
or place of origin, is a violation of human rights legislation." This list reflects the various ways
in which provincial human rights legislation have characterized racial identity. Further,
McDowell points out "[a]s with sexual harassment, the prohibition against racial discrimina-
tion that has developed in the case law is interpreted as prohibiting racial harassment as well.
As a result this type of harassment is prohibited regardless of whether there is an express
prohibition in the relevant human rights statute." See for example Ram v. McDonald's
Restaurants of Canada Ltd. (1992), 16 C.H.R.R. D170 (B.C. Powell).
88. [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825, 133 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [hereinafterRoss]. The complaint was filed under
the New Brunswick Human Rights Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. H- 1l, s. 5(1) which prohibited
discrimination based on "race, colour, religion, national origin, ancestry, place of origin, age,
physical disability, mental disability, marital status, sexual orientation or sex." The Board of
Inquiry found that a "poisoned educational environment" had been created on the grounds of
religion and ancestry and the Supreme Court upheld this finding. For a further description of
the case see infra note 94.
89. It is difficult to imagine an argument that harassment based on other protected character-
istics would not fit within the rubric of "discrimination." Once again this narrow restrictive
argument would not fit within the more broad, liberal method for interpreting human rights
legislation, as advocated by the Supreme Court. See supra note 26.
90. Robichaud, supra note 26.
91. lbid. at 95.
Beyond the Right to Offend: Academic Freedom, Rights and Responsibilities 105
the only parties that can take effective action to ensure an educational
environment free from sexual harassment.
92
There is support in the case law for holding the university responsible
when a professor harasses a student.93 Most notably in Ross, the Supreme
Court upheld a Human Rights Commission order that found a public
school board had discriminated when it failed to take effective action
to top an anti-Semitic teacher from causing a poisoned educational
environment. 94
2. The Standard For a "Poisoned" Climate
It is impossible to say whether the utterance of a particular word, phrase,
or idea will constitute a poisoned climate in the classroom or elsewhere.
Rather, this is a question of fact in each case. The seminal test from Janzen
v. Platy is:
Without seeking to provide an exhaustive definition of the term, I am of the
view that sexual harassment in the workplace may be broadly defined as
unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that detrimentally affects the work
environment or leads to adverse job-related consequences for the victims
of the harassment.95
Adapting this for the university context, the CAUT has said that the
university is "justified in forbidding, through fair procedures, behaviour
in the classroom which creates a persistently degrading and intimidating
environment based on race, sex, or sexual orientation .9 6 Of course, this
is not an exhaustive list of the protected grounds.97 These definitions are
92. Kilcoyne, supra note 80 at 46.
93. For example in Memorial University v. Rose (1989), 80 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 97,62 D.L.R.
(4th) 432 (Nfld. S.C.), a student lodged a sexual harassment complaint against a professor with
the Human Rights Commission. The University was added as a party in the complaint. The
University soughtj udicial review to have itself removed as a party, because the harassment had
occurred off campus. The trial court rejected the University's argument, holding that as the
professor's employer, it had granted him the supervisory status over the student which
facilitated the harassment. The Court of Appeal refused the University's appeal, (1990) 87
Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 233, 76 D.L.R. (4th) 284.
94. See Ross, supra note 88. The Human Rights Commission had found that an elementary
school's environment had been "poisoned" by anti-Semitism based on evidence at the hearing.
The poisoned educational environment was found to be linked to the out of class anti-Semitic
writing and speeches of a teacher. The school district was named in the complaint with the
teacher, and was found to have discriminated by failing to take effective measures to prevent
the discrimination in the provision of its service.
95. Janzen, supra note 14 at 1284 [emphasis added].
96. Supra note 7 [emphasis added].
97. The grounds vary from province to province but in addition to those listed by the CAUT,
the following are common: religion, physical or mental disability, and place of origin.
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also subject to the objective test for offensiveness, and the particular
context of each case.
Much has been written in the academic freedom debate about the
overbreadth of the poisoned climate definition. That is the argument that
any discussion of limiting classroom speech will necessarily produce an
unworkable "slippery slope", where much of what was once considered
"normal" discourse will be impugned as discriminatory. As Fekete
argues:
what used to be considered disagreements are increasingly treated as
heresies, deviating from orthodox beliefs.., the new piety is organized
around abstractions like equity and inclusion-very broad terms dripping
with the pathos of injustice and exclusion, and open to changing definition
by those who claim authority to speak for "disadvantage."98
These more alarmist visions of the poisoned climate test represent neither
the necessary interpretation, nor the likely path that a labour arbitrator or
human rights adjudicator would take, given the jurisprudence on harass-
ment.
To support the "overbreadth" argument, some authors have character-
ized anti-discrimination or poisoned environment tests as protecting
students against any slight, or any idea on any subject that they do not
wish to hear. This is simply not the case, at least insofar as the human
rights standard is concerned.99 The protection guaranteed by law is
tailored to prevent discrimination (including harassment) based on per-
sonal characteristics that have been enumerated in human rights legisla-
tion. This means protection for those who have historically been excluded
from equality in all aspects of society, including in the academy. Al-
though some writers have characterized anti-discrimination laws as
providing the "new authoritarians" with a veto power over ideas, they are
98. Moral Panic, supra note 9 at 203. In the American context, Dinesh D' Souza writes, supra
note 9 at 200, "higher education has succumbed to a new politics of racial and sexual
'sensitivity' which now dominates debate on all controversial questions involving race,
gender, or sexual orientation."
99. This paper does not attempt to analyze extensively any individual sexual harassment
policies. The focus is on the legal prohibition against discrimination provided in human rights
legislation, and how this sets a legal "floor" of rights for participants in universities. Individual
campus harassment policies may provide protection from a wider variety of conduct than
human rights legislation, but these would not have the same external force of law as human
rights legislation.
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firmly rooted in preventing harm to those with less power, and are linked
to a past and present experience of marginalization and discrimination. 00
It has also been argued that the test for the "poisoned" classroom will
consider only a purely subjective analysis of the offense claimed by the
student. However, the test for whether speech is offensive cannot be
purely subjective. This would result in a situation where the most thin-
skinned student could find a wide array of speech offensive.l0' Moreover
this is not in keeping with the way that the poisoned environment has
developed and been applied in cases arising in the workplace. Human
rights adjudicators and labour arbitrators have always considered whether
there is an objective reality to the sense of harm. For example, one
arbitrator said:
A standard of reasonableness is required in reviewing verbal conduct, both
as to the offensiveness, and whether it creates a harassing and negative
condition of work. 10
2
It is commonplace in labour arbitrations for the arbitrator to consider the
"reasonableness" of the conduct, rather than simply the victim's reported
harm.
10 3
However, in considering whether the conduct would be considered
harmful by the "reasonable" person, it is important that the arbitrator not
lose sight of the power differentials and societal context that are inherent
parts of sexual, racial, and other forms of harassment. In terms of sexual
harassment, for example, Patricia Hughes has pointed out that until quite
recently, sexual jokes and comments may have been a normal part of the
workplace for the "reasonable man", and so he may view them as
100. The particular characteristics included in human rights statutes are chosen by the
legislature, who presumably represent the public. This protects groups that have suffered a
known history of discrimination and who the legislature have deemed are unlikely to be treated
equally if society is left to its own devices. The inclusion of these characteristics in the
legislation indicate a greater public concern.
101. Some critics of the "zero tolerance" language in the Framework Document argued that
its definition of impugned conduct was too broad: "[zero tolerance] indicated that harassment
existed when an individual was made to feel uncomfortable by any action, even a single
comment that the individual believed had unacceptable sexual content", Shrank, supra note
70 at 70 [emphasis added]. If this is indeed the correct reading of the test in the Framework
document, it is too broad, and does not fit with the established jurisprudence on harassment.
102. Re Canadian Union of Public Employees and Office and Professional Employees
International Union, Loc. 491 (1982), 4 L.A.C. (3d) 385 at 401 (Swinton, Bardos, Vickers).
103. See for example Re Royal Towers Hotel Inc. and Hotel, Restaurant and Culinary
Employees and Bartenders Union, Loc. 40 (1992), 32 L.A.C. (4th) 264 (Blasina) [hereinafter
Royal Towers Hotel]; Re Toronto Hydro Electrical System and Canadian Union of Public
Employees, Loc. 1 (1988), 2 L.A.C. (4th) 169 (Davis); and Re Canada Post Corp. and
Canadian Union of Postal Workers (1983), 11 L.A.C. (3d) 13 (Norman).
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harmless. 104 The "reasonable woman" worker, who has been expected to
endure such comments may have a different perception. 15 Therefore,
reasonableness should be assessed with consideration of the particular
characteristics of the "victim."'06 This does not mean that the case should
rest solely on the victim's subjective sense of emotional harm, but rather
that the comments should be interpreted with reference to how a student
with the personal characteristics that were the subject of the comment
would reasonably respond. Further, this test should not rely on proving
that the professor intended the remarks to be harmful. 107
104. Hughes, "The Evolving Concept of Sexual Harassment", supra note 86 at 17: "in many
cases, the perpetrator will be the 'reasonable man' who sets the standard for determining
liability: yet the 'reasonable man' has until recently been relatively free to engage in workplace
'flirting', 'joking' and other sexually demeaning conduct with impunity."
105. Hughes explains that while sexual harassment theory attempts to refute the notion that
a sexualized workplace is "normal" or acceptable from a woman's perspective, in practice there
are a number of examples of labour arbitrators and human rights adjudicators who fail to
consider this. For example inAavik v. Ashbourne (1990), 12 C.H.R.R. D/401 (Nfld.), the male
respondent asked the female complainant "whether her 'sex life' was good, whether her
boyfriend was 'any good in bed' and told her that all she needed was 'to be rubbed in a certain
spot and [her] depression [would] be cured"' (among other incidents). The adjudicator found
that the course of conduct constituted a "lack of decorum"; "misguided attempts to cheer her
up"; and "a lack of understanding and sensitivity for [the complainant' s] personal integrity and
privacy", but found that there was not an "abusive working environment." As Hughes explains,
ibid. at 26, the arbitrator's refusal to consider the greater pattern of conduct, and the power
dynamic involved in sexual harassment led him to this result.
106. Hughes, ibid. at 25, calls this the "reasonable victim" test. She says "the appropriate
approach to sexual harassment requires taking into account how the characteristics of the
victim and those of the perpetrator affect the harassment, to determine whether harassment has
occurred." Shirish Chotalia raises the same concerns in the human rights tribunal context, and
notes that the "reasonable woman" test has been applied in the U.S., where "the District Court
acknowledged that there are significant differences between the perceptions of men and
women as to what constitutes sexual harassment" (citing Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards,
760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991)). See S. Chotalia, "Are Academic Freedom and Free
Speech Defences to Poisoned Educational Environment-What Can Ross Tell Us About
Sexual Harassment?" (1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 573 at 579.
107. Janzen, supra note 14, explicitly states that it need not be proved that the harasser
intended to harm the victims. This has been the approach in some arbitrations also. In Royal
Towers Hotel, supra note 103, the grievor was dismissed for sexually harassing fellow
employees. The union argued that the concept of sexual harassment is new to the workplace,
and the grievor had not known that his conduct fit within the definition. The arbitrator found
that ignorance of what constitutes sexual harassment is not a defence. A similar argument was
also raised in the "Collin grievance", supra note 19, involving a poisoned university classroom.
The Faculty Association argued that the professor did not intend his comments to be harmful
(relying on Re Canadian National Railway Co. and C.B.R.T. & G.W. (1988), 1 L.A.C. (4th)
183 (Picher) where the arbitrator rejected the "constructive knowledge" approach to sexual
harassment for assessing the grievor's conduct). The arbitrator in "Collin" rejected that
argument, and found that the grievor should have reasonably known that his conduct would
offend (the arbitrator also pointed out that Re Canadian National was decided before Janzen,
which redefined the standard of review for sexual harassment).
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In addition, the severity of the conduct has always been an important
consideration in harassment cases, and should continue to be so in the
case of the classroom. The notion of one reasonably innocuous "mistake"
or poor word choice automatically resulting in a finding of a "poisoned
climate" is simply not reflected in the case law. The finding of a poisoned
environment is a question of fact, and as such the "nature and gravity of
the conduct ... have to be assessed, and the link between the conduct and
the creation of a poisoned environment must be evaluated.""0 8 Thus, there
is room to consider the total context of the remarks, the frequency or
persistence, and the seriousness of them given these factors.
Certainly any consideration of the "poisoned" educational environ-
ment must recognize the uniqueness of the university classroom. This is
the other side of the equation that must be balanced with protecting
students from discrimination: the university does have a unique and
important mandate to seek the truth, which is one of the cornerstones of
the institution. A fundamental aspect of the professor's role as instructor
is to attempt to foster original thought and encourage students to push the
boundaries of their own accepted knowledge and values. Rather than
simply conveying information, as may be appropriate at other levels of
schooling, the post-secondary instructor is charged with this unique task.
Therefore, the university classroom is a distinct working environment,
and any attempt to measure whether the environment is "poisoned" must
consider this. The reasonable student would surely expect to be con-
fronted with discussions that may be unnecessary, and inappropriate in
another forum. 109 As the labour arbitrator said in one academic freedom
arbitration, the reasonableness of a situation must be assessed "by
reference to time, place, content, and style of the remarks."'' 0 Therefore,
in the university setting, it is important that labour arbitrators should not
simply transplant examples of situations from other contexts. In fact, in
labour arbitrations there is a strong tradition of considering particular
trade practices or customs, and the context of the particular case."1
108. Chotalia, supra note 106 at 604.
109. For example a worker in a factory may quite rightfully find conversations about human
sexuality to be irrelevant and therefore unwelcome, while the student in an English, Art History
or Psychology class may expect to discuss the topic.
110. "Vedanand grievance", supra note 58 at 59.
11. This established labour arbitration principle is reflected in a quote from Christie &
Mullan, supra note 30, that "tradition would suggest greater sympathy to the customs and
practice of the particular employment situation than would normally be found in the courts
[emphasis added]." Although it may have developed in the collective bargaining sphere,
arbitrators who are functioning outside of the collective bargaining regime may also make use
of this broad arbitral principle. In particular, where the special plan incorporates an Arbitration
Act by reference, taking account of trade custom and usage may be an explicit part of the
arbitrator's jurisdiction. See for example Arbitration Act, S.O. 1991, c. 17, s. 33.
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All of these principles are amply reflected in the current cases assess-
ing an alleged poisoned environment. Recognition of the poisoned
environment in the workplace has not resulted in an unworkable morass.
Rather labour arbitrators and human rights adjudicators have considered
reasonableness, and context."12 There is no real basis to argue that the
same would not happen in relation to the university classroom. The
alarmist vision of the test is unfounded, and as such does not provide a
good justification for arguing that the professor's behaviour in the
university classroom should never be reviewed.
In considering how a labour arbitrator should approach the issue of a
potentially poisoned classroom, it is crucial to note the difference
between the arbitration forum and the human rights tribunal. An arbitra-
tor interpreting the terms of the collective agreement or special plan is
concerned primarily with the relationship between the employer and the
employee. The obligations toward the student are still important, as they
make up a key part of the professor's professional responsibilities," 3
however outside of this the arbitrator owes no obligation to the "victim"
(in this case the student) to consider his or her rights. Even if a poisoned
environment or other employment offence is found, and discipline is
merited, the labour arbitrator is concerned with the employment relation-
ship between the university and the professor, and how this has been
112. In fact labour arbitrators and human rights adjudicators have often been too restrictive
in how they measure the reasonable harm to the victim. See generally Chotalia, supra note 105;
and Hughes, "The Evolving Concept of Sexual Harassment", supra note 86.
113. Because the focus is on the employment obligations, this also means that discipline
could be merited even in the absence of a "poisoned climate." This would depend on the
standard of behaviour required under the collective agreement, but might be on the basis of
incompetence or another ground. For example, in the "Collin grievance", supra note 19 at 81,
the professor's conduct towards students in the classroom was the grounds of a formal
harassment complaint, and ultimately discharge by the university. The University had
disciplined the grievor for violating the "Policy on Responsibilities of Academic Staff with
Regard to Students" (which was incorporated into the collective agreement). The arbitrator
said "it is not necessary for the University to establish that the grievor committed acts
amounting to sexual harassment. It is enough for it to establish that there was just and
reasonable cause for discipline." The arbitrator found that some of the grievor's comments
"probably constituted sexual harassment" but "more significantly his conduct was a breach of
[the Policy on Responsibilities]" as his conduct was "antithetical to his responsibilities to treat
students fairly and equitably and to discharge his institutional responsibilities with pedagogic
effectiveness", at 76.
Beyond the Right to Offend: Academic Freedom, Rights and Responsibilities 111
affected." 4 This would include whether the principles of progressive
discipline had been followed." 5
On the other hand, a human rights adjudicator is concerned with the
victim's rights and has a mandate to end the discriminatory situation.' 6
Therefore, although the human rights adjudicator does not set out to
punish the harasser, neither is he or she particularly concerned with
preserving the relationship between the accused harasser and his em-
ployer. This means also that the human rights adjudicator need not
consider academic freedom protections (or any other collective agree-
ment clause for that matter)." 7 Therefore, arbitration under the special
plan or collective agreement is where the question of academic freedom
while likely receive the most attention.
This means that it is quite possible that the arbitrator and the adjudica-
tor would arrive at a different result in the case, given these different
mandates." 8 In comparing jurisprudence from human rights tribunals, it
is essential to keep the larger framework of the employment arbitration
in mind. At the same time, principles derived in the human rights context
(such as the test for a poisoned environment) do make up an important
part of the labour arbitration jurisprudence, given that they represent a
standard which both the employer and employee are bound to uphold in
the course of their employment relationship.
114. See for example Re Canada Post Corp. and Canadian Union of Postal Workers (1987),
27 L.A.C. (3d) 27 (Swan), where the arbitrator found that although sexual harassment was
proven, and some discipline was merited, termination was too harsh and the grievor (harasser)
should be reinstated because of mitigating factors. These included the grievor's past work
record, and his problem with alcohol.
115. For example in Re Canadian National Railway Co. and C.B.R.T. & G.W. (1988), 1
L.A.C. (4th) 183 at 204 (Picher), where the arbitrator said that "sexual harassment, like any
disciplinary infraction, must be assessed having regard to the facts of the specific case,
including all mitigating factors, with due regard to the general standards of conduct tolerated
within the workplace, the length of service of the employee who is disciplined and the quality
of his or her prior record ......
116. As McIntyre J. said for the unanimous court in Simpson Sears, supra note 26 at 546-7,
"the [Human Rights] Code aims at the removal of discrimination.... Its main approach... is
not to punish the discriminator but rather to provide relieffor the victims of discrimination"
[emphasis added].
117. Although it might be advisable-see generally argument in Chotalia, supra note 106-
the adjudicator would be under no obligation to consider the clause.
118. For example the labour arbitrator may order the grievor reinstated, given the total
employment relationship, whereas a human rights adjudicator may order a more intrusive
remedy (as was done in Ross, supra note 88, where the teacher was removed from classroom
duties), in order to cease the discrimination.
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3. The Value of the Poisoned Climate Test
The poisoned climate test is often cited as the legal standard for measur-
ing invidious harassment in the classroom. However, too often this is
done without discussing why the test is valuable, or what specific harms
it is meant to address. As outlined earlier, the debate over the Ontario
government's "Framework" document indicates that there are vastly
divergent opinions about the professor's duty to the students in the
classroom. Despite judicial endorsement of the poisoned environment
there are those in the academic freedom debate that resist the concept.' 19
A recurrent refrain is that an argument on any topic, no matter how
objectionable is still "only words." Proponents of this view argue that so
long as a student is treated equally insofar as the most basic level of access
to education (such as being allowed to attend class and participate, having
work evaluated neutrally) then there is no real damage, and therefore no
discrimination.2 0 Some of these theorists admit that the student may
experience a certain amount of "discomfort" or even harm, but that it is
simply the necessary and inevitable price to be paid for free speech. 2
These viewpoints are largely based on the liberal tradition of the "market-
place of ideas." That is, the argument that if there is unfettered free speech
in the university classroom, then all the points of view in the spectrum will
be aired for debate, and inherently wrong concepts (such as racial
superiority) will naturally fall by the wayside if they are not the most
119. Those involved in the "Right to Offend" campaign appeared to advocate that the
definition of harassment from the Ontario Human Rights Code be "watered down and amended
for the University": Sangster & Zeleza, supra note 7 at 143.
120. As Fekete argues in Moral Panic, supra note 9 at 206-207, "as long as the university
remains secular and non-discriminatory in providing access to its offerings, as it is required to
do by law, it need not worry about individuals creating environments. Crucially, universities
have to abandon the misguided aspirations promoted by their biopolitical factions to reform the
'climate' or 'environment' by quasi-judicial means." In describing complaints under univer-
sity sexual and racial harassment policies, Fekete asserts, at 208-9: "Often ... the objections
are based on simple disputes about values, styles, personalities, as these are made manifest and
expressed in the course of the normal discharge of duties." Further "the unpleasantness
experienced by complainants is often of very brief duration and of slight impact" compared to
the "stress and trauma ... on the side of the accused."
121. For example, Julius Grey writes "[i]t follows that those dedicated to freedom of thought
should reconcile themselves to the fact that occasional expression of distasteful views-racist,
sexist, mendacious, scandalous-must be tolerated", in "Freedom of Expression in a Canadian
University Context" (1994) 44 U.N.B. L.J 119 at 129 [emphasis added]. This does not
acknowledge that to a person of colour, a racist argument is likely to be more than "distasteful."
American writer Charles Lawrence III points out in "If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus" [1990] Duke L.J. 431 at 472, that it is inevitably minorities or
women who have to pay the price but often it is white males who are quick to see the solution
as acceptable (that is, those who will not have to pay it themselves).
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logically rigorous. Under this view, discriminatory words need merely be
refuted with better ideas, and the "marketplace" will regulate itself.
This vision of classroom speech does not answer all of the relevant
questions about the university classroom. First of all, the absolutists fail
to recognize their own privilege and power in the classroom, and how it
negates the idea that all opinions in the spectrum will necessarily be
explored. They fail to acknowledge that the university classroom has
never been, and is not presently a "level playing field" for debate.
Although a student may try to refute racial, sexual or other stereotypes,
jokes or insults when the professor uses his or her position of authority to
legitimate them, it is unrealistic to expect the student to be able to dislodge
that authority. In addition, unlike speech in the public domain (such as a
debate in the student newspaper), students cannot simply choose not to
listen to the professor when he or she uses discriminatory speech. Further,
the absolutist argument does not account for the fact that a persistently
degrading atmosphere can effectively exclude the targeted students from
full and meaningful participation in the academy. This is reflected in the
real experiences of women and minorities-experiences that reveal the
need for a poisoned climate test. Therefore, it is simply not enough to
argue that the "marketplace" will necessarily rectify any of the harms,
given the context of the particular forum.
Perhaps the most pronounced way in which the playing field is
"uneven" is in the power that professors have in the classroom, compared
with students. The dynamics of the classroom belie the notion of the
"marketplace" or free forum. The professor sets the curriculum, assigns
the readings, organizes and presents the lectures, and usually decides
when students will participate by calling on them, and therefore controls
the debate.2 2 Students may, of course, add their ideas to the debate at the
appropriate juncture, but it is the professor who decides which academic
ideas or materials will be considered examinable, and therefore manda-
tory. Further, in order to prevent chaos in the classroom, there is a point
at which the professor may choose to limit debate, and lecture instead (for
example in order to ensure that all of the material on the syllabus is
covered when time is limited). At the extreme end of the scale, the
professor may limit the "expression" of those who interfere with the
professor's own opportunity to speak. For example, if noisy student
discussion or protest in the classroom became a form of "expression" that
122. Patricia Hughes, "Reconciling Valuable Interests", supra note I at 82, writes, "students
who wish to challenge the professor are 'outsiders' who are required to 'disrupt' the flow...
to insinuate themselves against the professor and quite likely against many oftheir classmates."
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prohibited the professor from lecturing, the professor would likely expect
that this form of expression be curtailed. The professor undoubtedly has
a right to speak at all times in the university classroom, whereas the
student does not.
However reasonable this state of affairs may be (to ensure that the
professor will be able to cover the required material in the course in a
particular period of time, and to prevent chaos), it does mean that the
professor is vested with a certain authority over the opportunity for
classroom speech. Further, the dynamic of the classroom is shaped by the
fact that students are a "captive audience." They must stay in the lecture
(assuming they wish to be able to pass exams, and continue to be allowed
to participate in the institution). Therefore, one of the cornerstone liberal
free speech arguments-if you are offended by someone's speech or
actions, don't listen (or watch)-is not applicable in this particular
context. Therefore, much like a worker on the job, the student must
remain within the forum, but is not guaranteed an equal opportunity to
control the discourse in the environment.
As John Kilcoyne has argued, when academic freedom is presented in
absolutist terms this represents a
failure, if not conscious refusal, to acknowledge that the differential
distribution of the opportunity to speak and the right to be heard imposes
correlative responsibilities. At a minimum, this includes an affirmative
duty to avoid abusing the power and authority which flow from this
freedom by silencing or excluding women students. 23
The power to silence can be effective whether exercised directly (such as
by refusing to allow women students to speak) or indirectly (for example
by referring to women students as "blondie" or "you brunette" as one
professor did,124 orby consistently trivializing the points made by women
in the class).
The professor's expertise, and the nature of his or her position as a
learned expert also shapes the debate in the classroom. Although students
will certainly add ideas to the debate, it is the professor who has the
authority, the information and the credibility to legitimize his or her
point. 125 Further, where a professor has fostered or created a climate that
123. Kilcoyne, supra note 80 at 54 [emphasis added].
124. See "Collin grievance", supra note 19 (described in greater detail later in this paper).
125. Bernice Shrank, supra note 70 at 73, writes, "teachers are hired primarily for their
expertise in an academic discipline, and that expertise is the source of their 'authority"',
although she does not view this power differential as problematic, or the source of a greater
responsibility.
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belittles women or minorities, it is not difficult to envision that their
voices will carry less weight in the debate. As one author describes,
"racism makes the words and ideas of blacks and other minorities less
saleable, regardless of their intrinsic value in the marketplace." 26 It is
difficult to see how the classroom is a pure "marketplace", where any
discriminatory ideas will necessarily be refuted when the deck is stacked
so heavily in favour of the professor. It is entirely appropriate where there
is this level of control to expect a correlative level of responsibility.
In addition to the issue of inequitable opportunities to be heard, the
absolutists do not recognize that real harm might be caused, even when
one uses "only words" against another. To better understand the ability
of certain words to function as acts of discrimination, it is useful to return
to the philosophical underpinnings of the poisoned climate theory. In
Janzen, the court rejected the theory that harassment occurred only where
the victim was threatened with "specific or direct consequences to [her]
employment status, or some gain or loss of tangible job benefits."'27 The
decision was a recognition of the power of words to act as a "gatekeeping
function" to remind women of their fragile and ascribed inferior status in
the workplace, and to limit women'sfull participation in the workforce.
Sexual harassment plays on "the assumption that women are primarily
sexualized beings and thus should be treated sexually. This notion of male
power is relevant not only in sexual harassment involving some form of
physical contact, but also in verbal and pictorial expressions."'' 28 There-
fore, the poisoned climate test recognizes that certain words are damag-
ing because they infuse the workplace with the assumption that women's
real role or value is as sexual objects, rather than serious and equal
workers. In Janzen, the court recognized that sexual harassment is
premised on the exploitation of this traditional power differential be-
tween men and women. 29 Patricia Hughes has pointed out that sexual
harassment can also be viewed as a "manifestation of that power", in other
words an attempt to use it.'3°
126. Lawrence, supra note 121 at 468. These comments could undoubtedly be applied to
sexist, homophobic, and other discriminatory ideas.
127. Hughes, "The Evolving Concept of Sexual Harassment", supra note 86 at 10.
128. G. Eden, "Sexual Harassment at Arbitration" (1993) 4 Lab. Arb. Yearbook 117 at 120.
129. Janzen, supra note 14 at 1284: sexual harassment is "an abuse of power. When sexual
harassment occurs in the workplace it is an abuse of economic and sexual power." This did not
mean that the individual harasser necessarily had power over the individual victim, but rather
that sexual harassment conjures up the historically marginalized place of women in the
workforce (and indeed in society). The Court quoted Anwar Aggarwal who "argues that sexual
harassment is used in a sexist society to ... 'underscore women's difference from, and by
implication, inferiority with respect to the dominant male group' and to 'remind women oftheir
inferior ascribed status'."
130. Hughes, "The Evolving Concept of Sexual Harassment", supra note 86.
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In the university context it is not difficult to imagine how infusing the
classroom with inappropriate, sexualized jokes about women would
make a reasonable woman feel as if she were not being treated as a serious
scholar. Rather, this sort of climate implies that the professor sees
women's real purpose as being for titillation and amusement, as sexual
objects. It was not so long ago that professors (and indeed administrators)
fully acknowledged that they saw no genuine role for women in the
university classroom. The sexualizing of women students in the class-
room conjures up this recent history. Speech that sexualizes women
simply draws on one of a variety of stereotypes. There are many other
ways to denigrate and insult students by using speech and concepts that
"poison" their learning environment based on a protected characteristic.
Many writers have chronicled first hand the real effect of harmful
stereotypes or hate speech in the classroom on minorities and women.
Where concepts such as race, gender or sexual orientation are brought
into the classroom inappropriately, those who have been marginalized on
those grounds explain the pain, the rawness, and the exposure this brings.
Where students are attacked or belittled in this way, it is impossible for
them to feel a part of the university classroom, or the learning process. In
the American context, Charles Lawrence III illustrates how "the testi-
mony of non-white students about the detrimental effect of racial harass-
ment on their academic performance is overwhelming."' 31 Darryl Brown
writes that "the daily repetition of subtle racism and subordination in the
classroom.., can ultimately be, for African Americans, more productive
of stress, anxiety and alienation than even blatant racist acts."' 32 This
unique burden for black students means that "when racially insensitive
behaviour occurs in the classroom or elsewhere in the university, black
students are deprived of the opportunity to receive an education free of
harassment, hurt and humiliation."'' 33
Mari Matsuda has chronicled the "Victim's Story" in detail and writes,
"however irrational racist speech may be, it hits right at the emotional
131. Lawrence, supra note 121 at 465. Among the sources cited by the author in support of
this proposition are: The Report of President's Ad Hoc Committee on Racial Harassment,
University of Texas at Austin, 27 November 1989; and the Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination, Report of the University of Massachusetts Investigation 1986, at Footnote 126
of Lawrence.
132. D. Brown, "Racism and Race Relations in the University" (1990) 76 Va. L. Rev. 295 at
323 [footnote omitted].
133. Ibid. Brown identifies that "the harm can, of course, occur to other racial or ethnic
minority groups as well, just as sexist remarks amount to the same injury against women and
homophobic remarks amount to the same injury against gay and lesbian students."
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place where we feel the most pain." 34 Many studies have revealed that
for racial minorities, experiencing a racist insult tends to have a grave and
unique impact on an individual's emotional and psychological well-
being)35 One psychology professor summarizes:
[Psychological studies in 1984, 1987 and 19921 described the responses of
individuals of African descent who reported experiences of racism. The
reactions appeared consistent with intrusion and avoidance symptoms.
Responses included difficulty concentrating, frustration, hypervigilence,
denial, withdrawal and avoidance behaviour.3 6
A pervasive, derogatory climate in the classroom may effectively limit
equal access to the learning process for many groups, by creating an
unfair psychological burden that is not present for other students.
In a further example of how this "burden" can work, Patricia Williams
has written about the nature of forcing black law students to argue
"objectively" about problems that present racist generalizations and
stereotypes. 3 7 She describes how one such exam problem
places an enormous burden on black students in particular, who must
assume, for the sake of answering the questions, these things about
themselves-this is the trauma of gratuitous generalization. The frame
places blacks in the position of speaking against ourselves. It forces us to
accept as "truth" constructions that go to the heart of who we are.3 s
The distinction between discriminatory words and overt discriminatory
conduct is flawed. It fails to realize that hate messages are not a symptom
of discrimination, they are discrimination.139 Cases such as Janzen and
134. "Public Responses to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story" (1989) 87 Mich.
L. Rev. 2320 at 2335.
135. Matsuda, ibid. at 2335-40, details studies which have demonstrated the emotional and
psychological harm inflicted on the victims of hate speech. For example, one study found that
"psychological responses to racist victimization include withdrawal, clowning, strengthening
in-group ties, self-hate, militancy, status-striving and the self-fulfilling prophecy", ibid. at
footnote 84.
136. V.L.S. Thompson, "Perceived Experiences of Racism as Stressful Life Events" (June
1996) 32(3) Community Mental Health Journal 223 at 225.
137. See P. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1991) For a further description see infra notes 162-163. The exam problem in question
was an updated version of Shakespeare's Othello. Williams, at 80, describes: "Othello is
described as a 'black militaristic African leader' who marries the 'young white Desdemona'
whom he then kills in a fit of sexual rage. Othello is put on trial. The students were to identify
the elements of murder. The model answer gives points for ability to 'individualize the test' of
provocation by recognizing that a 'rough untutored Moor' might understandably be deceived
by the wiles of a more sophisticated European'."
138. Ibid. at 82 [emphasis added].
139. "Rather than being only symptoms of racism, sexism or heterosexism, hate expressions
are a part of the message of inferiority that these practices want to convey, and are thus an
important part of these practices": Major, supra note 20 at 20.
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more recently Ross are an affirmation that some words do more than
"offend" or "annoy." They marginalize and limit access. Words are not
neutral-"language can be an assault on the identity" 40 and can cause
concurrent harm for the listener.
Further, it is important to note that harmful speech based on a personal
characteristic that has been the source of historical discrimination is
unique. It is more than an insult or a slight, it is an exercise of power of
the dominant over the less dominant. There are words and concepts that
conjure up a recent history where legal segregation was propped up by the
assumption that some people were of lesser value than others,' 4' and a
present experience where many of these attitudes are still evident in daily
life. 142 Without a similar history of denial and discrimination, members
of historically dominant sectors of society cannot experience the same
marginalization in the debate and so are able to participate in the "benign
intellectual exercise" without personalization. 43 The liberal approach-
that one should just refute racist, sexist and other hate speech-fails to
recognize that not everyone can treat these concepts as "only words", and
that there are not comparable insults that will carry the same burden for
members of historically dominant groups.
The "right to offend" theorists and others have failed to appropriately
consider the issues of harm and of classroom power. Not only is this an
analysis incomplete, it also results in a view of the university that is
unconcerned with providing access to all participants. This is surely
antithetical to the mission of the university. As one article describes:
140. Hughes, "Reconciling Valuable Interests", supra note I at 85.
141. One need not look far into Canadian history to find examples of legal rules that restricted
privileges for women (such as property laws), aboriginal persons (such as being denied the right
to vote), the disabled (such as enforced institutionalization and sterilization) and persons of
colour (such as "head taxes" for Chinese immigrants). The same is true for other personal
characteristics such as religion and sexual orientation. These are only a few of the formal legal
barriers that have existed. In addition, society's informal barriers were also prevalent and
limiting.
142. Patricia Hughes, "The Evolving Concept of Sexual Harassment", supra note 86 at 6,
explains in the context of gender discrimination, "[flor a woman to be propositioned, leered at,
exposed to pornography or made the subject ofjokes invokes herplace in society at large. This
is simply not true for heterosexual men on a systemic level. As Faraday says'[t]o remind a man
of his sexuality is to remind him of his power; to remind a woman of her sexuality is to remind
her of her vulnerability"' [emphasis added]. The same is no doubt true where one invokes
societal bias against sexual orientation, disability, race, religion, or other historically marginalized
characteristics.
143. CA UTStatus of Women Supplement, supra note 22 at 3: "the required objectivity" under
the marketplace of ideas concept "may be possible for one who has never been denied life or
liberty based on his skin colour or race."
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[T]he tenor of this debate and its emphasis on freedom, but little or no
contemplation of our responsibilities, or of harassment, power differen-
tials, and social inequalities in our universities, has taken a decisive new
path: we are seeing a major reaction against equity, inclusivity, and anti-
harassment policies in our universities."*
In considering the professor's obligations to the student, there is a need
to return the debate to some of our essential assumptions about the
university, such as the notion that all of those who are qualified to
participate should have the opportunity to do so fully and equally.1 45
In general, the argument that discriminatory speech in the classroom
is best handled by allowing the debate to regulate itself rests on the
"assumption that the university is a neutral, totally accessible egalitarian
community." 146 Unfortunately, proponents of this view fail to address the
fact that this "contradicts historical and contemporary reality."'' 47
IV. The Spectrum of Academic Conduct: Lessons from the Cases
Having examined the important concerns in assessing academic freedom,
it is useful to apply these underlying principles to actual examples of
behaviour in the classroom. 48 There are important distinctions between
the different sorts of conduct in the available cases and the concerns that
they raise. Where the university's conduct in disciplining a professor is
in question, an arbitrator should exercise varying levels of deference to
the professor's academic freedom right, depending on the nature of the
impugned speech, and how the academic freedom fight is being claimed.
First, it is important to distinguish between offensive conduct that is
simply part of the style or manner utilized by the professor, and offensive-
ness in the actual academic content of what is being taught. As the CAUT
Status of Women Committee has said:
There is a significant difference between ideas themselves and the presen-
tation of ideas in a particular manner and context. It is possible to present
144. Sangster & Zeleza, supra note 7 at 144 [second emphasis added].
145. In Berg, supra note 81, the Supreme Court affirmed that there is a legal assumption that
the university must function in this way.
146. Sangster & Zeleza, supra note 7 at 140-1.
147. Ibid.
148. Some of the concerns identified as part of the unique nature of the classroom (for
example the power dynamic and the "captive audience") may not be relevant to other parts of
the professor's role. For example, research or public speeches about research might be judged
by a different measure than the provision of classroom education. It is outside of the confines
of this paper to consider how all of the different spheres of academic speech should be treated,
but it is important to bear in mind that some of the factors that shape the classroom may not be
present elsewhere.
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ideas in a clear and effective fashion that nevertheless reflects respect for
the values and perspectives of other people involved in the discussion. This
form of respect is particularly important if the listeners are a captive
audience, as students are. Adoption of a style of presentation that abuses
or marginalizes others is a behavioral choice, and not a matter of intellec-
tual right.1 49
The arbitrator should discern whether the impugned conduct is simply the
method used by the professor (for example the choice of language, or of
an example to illustrate an inoffensive point) rather than the academic
message itself. Where it is simply the manner of presentation that is the
crux of the complaint, the professor should be afforded the least defer-
ence. That is to say, if the professor is simply exercising a behavioural
choice to use language for presentation that could reasonably be said to
poison the environment, there would seem to be little to support that
choice in a balancing.
This method would certainly be a departure from the approach promul-
gated in the "right to offend" document. That document specifically
claims the right to absolute power over the choice of words, no matter
what the reason, and no matter how they may harm students. However,
the need for a serious academic purpose in choosing objectively offensive
words or material must be a minimal threshold before academic freedom
can be claimed. The absolutist view of academic freedom would not
appear to be consistent with the universal qualifier: the "duty to use
[academic freedom] in a manner consistent with the scholarly obligations
to base research and teaching on an honest search for knowledge."' 50 The
right to simply use language that creates a poisoned climate for particular
students, without any pressing academic purpose would not appear to be
premised on advancing the search for knowledge and truth.
There may, however, be an instance where word choice or manner of
presentation is integral to the ideas or concepts that are being taught, and
therefore is in itself part of a serious academic pursuit. This could be
addressed by a test that asked whether a reasonable person would teach
the academic concept in another way that would achieve the same
pedagogical goals, but would not have the same potential for harm (i.e.
was it an unreasonable choice to teach this way?). This means asking
whether the impugned speech is core or peripheral to the academic
concept or goal being addressed, and so calls for an explanation of why
the expression or conduct were required in order to fulfil the search for
truth, or a pressing academic objective. Certainly, the right to choose any
149. CAUTStatus of Women Supplement, supra note 22 at 3 [emphasis added].
150. See discussion of professor's obligations, supra notes 65 & 66 and accompanying text.
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sort of language (even when a reasonable person would say that the
language creates a poisoned environment) without a strong rationale
must be seen as being at the low end of the scale for academic freedom
protection. Such a broad conception of what is included within the rubric
of protected academic speech does not account for the important and
recognized qualifier that the freedom be used in the pursuit of an
academic purpose or goal.
This sort of case may arise where the professor purports to "shake up"
students through controversial language, or may include using offensive
examples as "jokes" or to illustrate a point. One of the few Canadian
arbitration cases to consider the poisoned university classroom environ-
ment,151 the Jacques Collin grievance, exemplifies these elements. Pro-
fessor Collin taught architecture at the University of Manitoba for twenty
years. His teaching style led a student to lodge a formal complaint under
the University's Sexual Harassment Policy. The complaint laid out more
than twelve specific examples of Professor Collin's classroom
behaviour.'52 In addition to the information in the sexual harassment
complaint, the arbitrator heard evidence from the complainant, and other
students about their negative classroom experiences with Professor
Collin. 53 In contrast, a number of students testified on behalf of Collin
to show how his "methods" had worked for them, and that the "shock"
151. Although the "Collin grievance", supra note 19 at 77, is informative on the issue of the
unacceptable classroom conduct, it does not consider the defence of academic freedom. The
Faculty Association did not argue that Collin's conduct ought to be viewed in that context.
However the arbitrator did appear to address the issue somewhat, saying "latitude clearly must
be allowed to university professors in the manner in which they communicate their ideas, but
by any reasonable standard some of Professor Collin's conduct was far outside the boundary
of possible latitude."
152. They included: continually referring to the women in the class as "you blonde" or "you
brunette"; to describe an architecture principle known as "efficient action", using the analogy
"if you want to rape a woman you don't stick it in her armpit." Further, the Respondent
allegedly used such words as phrases as "Fucking Chinese." In addition to harassment, the
complainant alleged that Professor Collin used profane language and insults to critique
students work, for example "this drawing is a fucking piece of shit" or "you're a fucking
asshole", ibid. at 9.
153. One woman student testified that his comments "tended to show women as objects and
put them in inferior or degraded positions", ibid at 18. She said that "his remarks intimidated
her and she felt that she was put in an inferior position because of her sex." A Chinese student
testified that Professor Collin had said "What are you Chinese Coolies doing here?" and that
he felt very offended, and mistreated. He also stated that "[he] did not want to antagonize Collin
and would not dare challenge him. He felt that Collin had great power in the department and
might fail him", ibid. at 19.
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value was beneficial to their learning, and that they did not feel he was
racist or sexist. 154
Regardless of how individual students may have responded to the
climate in the classroom, the arbitrator (quite rightly) considered whether
the remarks could reasonably be said to be offensive, and concluded that
they could. '55 He found that "latitude must clearly be given to university
professors in the manner in which they communicate their ideas, but by
any reasonable standard some of Professor Collin's conduct was far
outside the boundary of permissible latitude."' 56 This indicates that
despite the more alarmist view promoted by the "right to offend" camp,
an arbitrator considering the university classroom is quite likely to
consider the context of the classroom, and use a reasonableness standard.
However, John Fekete's account of the same affair typifies the narrow-
ness, and the one-sidedness that infuses the "right to offend" platform. 157
154. In fact, one student said that "had the language not been harsh, he would not have
remembered the [academic] point", ibid. at 37. Although, in contrast, another pro-Collin
student acknowledged that other professors were effective without using these methods.
Notably, although some women and visible minority students testified on behalf of Collin, they
identified that they did feel bothered by references that "personalized" them. One woman was
bothered by his reference to her as a "brunette." One male student of Chinese origin had "heard
Collin use the terms 'fucking coolies"' and was upset. He did say that he felt very offended,
but later came to the conclusion that Collin did not mean to put down Chinese students. At the
same time, he identified that Collin should be more careful, and "at the start he was so offended
that he was considering transferring to another university", ibid. at 42.
155. In finding that the grievor had committed "conduct flagrantly inconsistent with the
duties and responsibilities of professors under the ... Agreement", the arbitrator "ma[de]
reference to two of the incidents", the rape comment, and the references towards Chinese
students. Of the first comment, he said "it is bizarre in the extreme" for the professor "to
illustrate whatever point he was trying to make ... by analogyzing to an act that in all its
connotations whether as a manifestation of power or of sexual violence is intensely upsetting
to most people, and certainly to most women" [emphasis added]. Further, the references to
Chinese students were "inherently demeaning and degrading" and "completely unacceptable
in any environment", ibid. at 72-3. Thus, the arbitrator did not focus on the actual harm
experienced by the students, rather he made his decision based on the objective reasonable
harm of the events. In fact, the arbitrator placed no importance on the fact that some students
found the teaching methods effective. He said "what is relevant is that his teaching methods
to a measurable extent were offensive", ibid. at 75.
156. Ibid. at 76-7 [emphasis added].
157. Moral Panic, supra note 9 at 22. Fekete argues that the arbitration was decided because
of the purely subjective offense of a few students which is simply not the case. He contends that
the arbitrator should have taken more account of the fact that a number of the students testified
for the professor, and "found the learning environment not only suitable, but outstandingly
successful"-in other words, a call for the arbitrator to consider the subjective experience of
particular students (notably, Fekete also fails to acknowledge that many of those who testified
on behalf of Collin were not "personalized" by the comments, that is they did not have the
personal characteristics that were at issue). By Fekete's own assertion, the standard of
appropriate behaviour in the classroom should not simply be determined by the most "thin-
skinned" student. It is quite inconsistent, then, to argue that it should be set by the most "thick-
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For example, Fekete claims that "intellectual values are utterly subordi-
nated to therapeutic values in [Arbitrator] Freedman's argument" but
never analyzes the supposed intellectual value of a comment like "you
fucking Chinese coolies", which the professor used to address Chinese
students in the class.' 58 To defend the pure choice of the professor to use
this sort of language, with no analysis of the harm it can inflict is a
complete abdication of responsibility.
The "Collin grievance" demonstrates that even where the materials
themselves are not offensive, the professor can do a great deal of harm to
certain students in the way he or she presents concepts. Students who felt
personalized by Professor Collin's remarks were not able to "separate"
their feelings from their learning experience, and were not confident that
the professor did not "mean" to discriminate.159 Although there was no
evidence that Collin ever had, or would have marked students differently,
or done other overt behaviours (other than his classroom speech), the
poisoned climate was enough to make those students "turn off' the
learning process, or feel that they did not dare answer back to Collin. 160
Patricia Williams has raised some of these concerns, in the realm of
law school examination questions. 61 She describes the use of "loaded"
hypothetical, that use racial, gender, and other characteristics as extrane-
ous information in a way that is "gratuitous and voyeuristic."' 62 Ex-
amples raised by Williams include:
a tax exam that asks students to calculate the tax implications for Kunta
Kinte's master when the slavecatchers cut off his foot;
a constitutional-law exam in which students are given a lengthy text of
hate-filled polemic entitled "How To Be a Jew-Nigger" and then told to
use the first amendment to defend it;
skinned." Fekete's argument here illustrates how the narrow focus (the argument that the
professor's rights are always paramount) does not lead to a principled analysis, but rather a
result-deterministic argument.
158. Ibid. at 22.
159. See supra note 153.
160. For example the original claimant who had filed the sexual harassment claim testified
that she had a hard time concentrating, began to have migraine headaches, and generally did
not want to attend school, "Collin grievance", supra note 19 at 11-2. She identified that she felt
frustrated and upset with the constant comments from the professor, and did approach him to
explain her concerns, but to no avail. She suffered "abuse and emotional distress ... and she
said she learned little from Collin", ibid. at 14. Another woman reported, at 19, that his remarks
intimidated her and she felt that she was put in an inferior position because of her sex. For an
example of student fear about raising concerns, see supra note 153.
161. See supra note 137.
162. For a description of the harm, and the added academic burden that these sorts of
examples bring to women and minorities, see supra note 137.
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many, many questions in which women are beaten, raped and killed in
descriptions pornographically detailed (in contrast to streamlined ques-
tions, by the same professors, that do not involve female victims).'63
It is not argued that these particular exam questions, taken alone, would
necessarily create a poisoned environment-that is question that would
have to be decided on the facts of an individual case. However, these
examples raise the key question: given the potential of the material to
harm, was it a reasonable choice to include it in order to meet the
academic goal of the exercise? Or, is the use of the exam question simply
an unreasonable act of choosing a potentially offensive example from a
wide variety of available examples that would meet the same academic
goal.
Even if there is a strong academic goal in mind in using the material
(as might be argued in the First Amendment example' 64) there is still
room to acknowledge the potential impact on particular students, and to
consider other ways of meeting the academic goal without forcing the
student to confront head on racial epithets and slurs. This is simply the
question of whether the professor acts reasonably and responsibly in the
classroom. 165 The question of using offensive examples or language
(when they are in fact core to the academic goal being pursued) reason-
ably and responsibly will be discussed below.
The other sort of case where academic freedom concerns may arise is
where the content of teaching materials or theories are attacked as being
themselves offensive. This is where it is the essence of the idea that is
being taught that is impugned. This is distinct from where offensive
material or words are used to explain an inoffensive concept. Here the
professor is doing more than exercising a choice about words to use, but
rather is functioning within the more enigmatic sphere of academic ideas.
When an academic theory, or text is impugned as being discriminatory,
it is normally not possible to sever the offending language and leave the
intellectual concept intact, as it might be in the case of an offensive
manner or style. Requiring a professor to teach theories of architecture
without using racist slurs or sexist examples is another matter entirely
163. Ibid. at 84-5.
164. That is the argument that the object of the academic exercise is to argue for free speech,
despite the merits of its content,.which is the dominant First Amendment approach in the U.S.
165. Williams acknowledges that these sorts of materials raise a Catch-22 situation: the goal
is not to bar any discussion of racial or sexual stereotypes from the classroom-in fact,
addressing these concepts are an essential part of working towards equality. The problem is that
these issues should be handled appropriately, with care for the listener, and not used
"gratuitously" with no critical discussion.
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than banning the architecture theories themselves. Rather, a different sort
of inquiry is necessary in this situation.
When the discussion turns to evaluating the actual content of academic
ideas, rather than evaluating the choice of language or examples, the
analysis undoubtedly becomes more complex. It is in this area that the
ideals and goals of the university-the search for truth and the advance-
ment of knowledge-must be most strongly considered. Where the
arbitrator is asked to judge the validity or content of an academic idea or
theory, a much higher degree of deference is required than with the
manner or style of presentation. However, the arbitrator must still
recognize that there are duties and understandings under the employment
agreement regarding the teaching role. There may be some theories that
are so unsubstantiated by fact they cannot be said to be a part of the
"unfettered search for truth" which is the aim of academic freedom, and
may also violate the duty for competent scholarship. Further, the profes-
sor also has obligations to act reasonably and responsibility in the
teaching process.
The first level of this analysis is to query whether a concept or piece
of material is really used so as to meet the requirement that academic
freedom be exercised in the honest advancement of scholarship. Shirish
Chotalia has written on the appropriate considerations for a human rights
adjudicator in examining if the university classroom is poisoned. She
argues that academic freedom might be seen as a sort of "bona fide"
defence to a claim of a poisoned environment. The criteria she lays out to
measure this are useful in examining the seriousness of the academic
pursuit. 166 These include: whether the expression or theory is in the
professor's area of expertise (for the classroom, it may be appropriate to
add whether the material is within the confines of the curriculum for the
course); whether the expression is based on statistics or other analysis
from which the premise was logically derived; and whether the idea is
based on complete and extensive research, rather than just supposition. 6 7
Some of these measures also speak to the duty of competent scholar-
ship. The professor is always obligated to teach competently. There may
be some theories that are so roundly unaccepted by the standards of
scholarship that a professor could be seen as incompetent for teaching
them. Despite the difficulty of assessing truth, it would be ludicrous to
166. Chotalia, supra note 106.
167. Ibid. at 609. Chotalia properly identifies that this list may not be exhaustive. There may
be other ways to evaluate whether a concept can really be said to represent a serious academic
pursuit.
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afford academic freedom protection to someone teaching that the earth is
not round, or that the holocaust did not occur. These are things that have
been proven to be true. Where the difficulty occurs is with concepts that
are controversial, but not unproven. The arbitrator must be extremely
wary of simply substituting his or her own opinion of the theory for the
professor's. Undoubtedly, the knowledge required to properly evaluate
academic theory will likely be outside of the arbitrator's expertise.
Therefore, it is important to bear in mind the system of peer review that
is in place in the academy. That is, the professor's work is periodically
judged by other members of his or her field in order to ensure that it meets
the standard for academic scholarship. 168 If adequate information is not
available through this sort of mechanism, the arbitrator may be required
to turn. to expert opinion. The arbitrator could hear from qualified
individuals who can place the impugned concept or theory in the greater
picture of the discipline. Of course, the arbitrator would have to hear from
experts presented by both the university and the professor. 169 There is an
important caveat to this review, however. Academic theory is inherently
contentious. There will likely always be supporters and detractors for
almost every academic theory. 7 ' The search should not be for the best,
or the most accepted theory, but rather whether it is a concept that is so
roundly unacceptable as to be an incompetent exercise of scholarship to
teach it.' 7  As one writer has described, when one sets out to analyze
academic ideas "it is not enough to denounce a line of research because
it may be ideologically repugnant: it is necessary to critique that research
carefully and dispassionately on its merits. '"172
168. For example in order to justify a salary increase there might be a yearly performance
review. This will depend on the terms of the Agreement.
169. It is acknowledged that this approach has the potential to result in a parade or battle of
experts. This may lengthen the hearing and add to the cost. However, as in other areas of law
where experts are used this is preferable to having the arbitrator simply make an unqualified
assessment as to the merits of the concept.
170. For example, it is difficult to discern "truth" in history. The work of David Irving, writer
of a "sympathetic" biography of Nazi Joseph Goebbels, raises some of these questions. Irving
has been described by prominent German historian Gordon Craig as a "serious" historian, and
as a "great historian of Fascism" by another reviewer. Other experts have denounced Irving as
a Nazi sympathizer whose work is revisionist history. See J. Heilbrunn, "Nazism" Globe and
Mail (19 October 1996) D5.
171. Because of the difficulty of assessing this, if there is doubt the arbitrator should err on
the side of the professor. If the methodology and the other indicia of scholarship (such as
publication in reputable academic journals) stand up to the requirements for acceptable
scholarship, it is hard to argue that the professor is incompetent in teaching the particular
theory, nor that she is not engaged in a serious academic pursuit.
172. H.H. Fairchild, "Scientific Racism: The Cloak of Objectivity" (1991) 47(3) J. Soc.
Issues 101 at 102.
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Assuming that the material does meet the threshold test for being a
bonafide academic exercise, and based on acceptable scholarship, there
is still room to consider whether the professor acted responsibly in the
way the material was used in the classroom. The professor's duties
include the obligations to teach without creating a poisoned environment,
and in many Agreements the duty to act responsibly in exercising
academic freedom. This is where the questions of context and the
reasonableness of the professor's actions will determine whether the
potentially harmful materials were properly handled.
It is appropriate that where materials taught are those that "a reason-
able person would say would be offensive to a particular group"'7 3 (for
example by advocating the inferiority of a racial group), then the
professor should be required to handle those materials with care. The
CAUT Status of Women have proposed that
[ilogic and experience indicate that when material, based on sound and
honest scholarship, conveys what can be seen as a negative message about
women or a particular racial group, for example, a professor should be
expected to present the material in a way that does not disempower or
demean any members of a group in the class. This material can be
presented with an explicit acknowledgement of its potential for disruption
and a sound rationale for its inclusion in the course to justify its disturbing
consequences."
There are several questions relating to whether material was used
responsibly. The first is the context of the classroom discussion. The
arbitrator should consider the professor's academic purpose in including
the material; there is a difference between including material to illustrate
a point, and including it to promote its contents as truth. Further, the
arbitrator should consider how materials were introduced and handled in
the academic context. Important questions include: whether any other
perspectives or opinions were included to illustrate the counter-argu-
ments that would potentially refute the offensive materials; whether the
materials or concepts were taught with regard to the effect on the listener.
This might mean identifying the potential for harm with the materials, and
warning students before assigning them. It might also mean allowing a
forum for students to talk about the destructive nature of the material,
rather than simply lecturing on the material in a vacuum.
This view of academic freedom is based on the notion that the
professor's own freedom is limited by the rights of students and others to
173. CAUT Status of Women Supplement, supra note 22.
174. Ibid. at 3 [emphasis added].
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participate fully in the learning environment, which can only be done in
a climate that is respectful of gender, race, and other marginalizing
factors. This approach is useful for a variety of reasons. First of all, it
identifies that there are difficult concepts, theories and ideas that may be
inherently offensive to some groups, and taken out of context could be
said to create a poisoned environment.'75 At the same time, however,
there may be valid academic reasons for including the materials in the
course.'76 The purpose of this analysis is not to definitively "outlaw"
concepts, or to make certain works taboo. 77 The idea is not to deny that
the text or idea ever existed, but rather to provide a proper forum for
discussing it.
This approach requires that the professor who utilizes this sort of
material consider his or her own rationale for including the material and
"justify its consequences." 7 Placing this responsibility on the professor
is commensurate with the power dynamic and the nature of students as the
"captive audience." Arbitrator Freedman identified this to some extent in
the "Collin grievance", where he said,
there is a great risk when a professor either deliberately and provocatively,
or because it is an inherent part of his teaching style, conducts himself the
way Professor Collin did. The risk is that he will offend and injure. The
professor has to bear the consequences of that conduct.'79
There is, of course, a point at which material will offend some groups
regardless of how it is handled. If inherently offensive materials based on
acceptable scholarship are presented for the truth of their contents, then
it is difficult to imagine how this could be done at all without offending
the targeted group. There are ideas that no amount of proper presentation
will make less harmful when they are taught as truth in a course. Examples
of this sort of information might include:
175. For example in the study of law, there are cases where the judiciary clearly blame women
for being the authors of their own fate in sexual assaults. Similarly, cases on racial harassment
may involve racial slurs. Both of these studies may include language and concepts that are
deeply offensive and hurtful.
176. In the examples given of case law, showing the inequities in law can be essential to an
argument that it is in need of reform.
177. For example, Adolph Hitler's Mein Kampf may be included on a reading list in order to
highlight the insidious nature of fascism, and the power of the words that brought Hitler to
power in Germany. It is certainly true that the text may be considered offensive, and if it is
presented without any contextual references, or counter-arguments it may be problematic in a
classroom setting.
178. CA UT Status of Women Supplement, supra note 22 at 3.
179. "Collin grievance", supra note 19 at 73.
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(1) arguments that homosexuality is not a "natural" condition and that it
can be "cured";' 80
(2) theories about genetic racial inferiority;'' and
(3) arguments about natural or appropriate societal roles based on
gender. 8
2
Perhaps the most notorious Canadian situation involving controversial
material is that of Philippe Rushton, a professor at the University of
Westem Ontario. Professor Rushton's research into racial difference led
him to conclude that there is a "hierarchy" of races in terms of intelligence
and development.'83 He made several highly publicized appearances in
the United States, to present his theory that ranked "Orientals",
"Caucasoids" and "Africans" in that order (from highest to lowest). 184
This resulted in an outcry from members of the campus and the general
public. The University administration supported Rushton' s right to carry
on his research (under the rubric of academic freedom) and refused to fire,
suspend or discipline him. The University did require that he record his
lectures on video, and not appear in person at the lectures. 85 Ultimately,
even this restriction was lifted, and Rushton resumed normal teaching
duties.
Rushton's case exemplifies the most difficult to resolve "category" of
cases, because it involves controversy over an honestly-held academic
belief; however, this does not mean that a situation like Rushton' s should
go uninvestigated by the university. If Rushton's academic freedom had
180. This example is based on the case of a social work student at the University of Michigan
who argued that homosexuals could be "cured" and was charged under the University of
Michigan's hate speech code, which was subsequently struck down as unconstitutional in Doe
v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (the student was cleared of
harassment under the code proceedings). Cited in D'Souza, supra note 9 at 148.
181. Professor Philippe Rushton, discussed infra.
182. In Doe v. University of Michigan, supra note 180, the actual complaint against the
speech code was brought by a student in biopsychology, who argued that under the code he may
not be able to discuss or explore controversial racial or gender theories about natural
characteristics.
183. The methods Rushton used to "prove" his theory were subject to numerous criticisms
(see for example Halford Fairchild, supra note 172, who argues that Rushton misrepresented
his empirical data bases, and made other methodological errors). In addition his publications
were all in one periodical, which critics charged was funded by Nazi sympathizers. It is not
possible within the scope of this paper to fully critique Rushton's findings and methodology,
however it is noteworthy that his own department at the University of Western Ontario at one
point judged his racial theories to be "scientifically unsatisfactory" at his annual performance
review. See S. Page, "Philippe Rushton: Honest Academic or Sinister Racist" Ottawa Citizen
(15 January 1995).
184. Ranking was "according to brain size, intellectual aptitude, sexual restraint/permissive-
ness and social organization": McIntyre, supra note 11 at 13.
185. Page, supra note 183.
130 The Dalhousie Law Journal
been breached by a university action and the case was before an arbitrator,
one of the key concerns should be competence. If the university did
decide to discipline Rushton, it might be because the material he was
using fell below the acceptable standards for a rigorous and honest search
for truth and dissemination of knowledge. 8 6
Further, an arbitrator contemplating Rushton's role as teacher should
consider whether his theories, because of their nature, were handled
responsibly. The Council of Ontario Universities issued a statement
regarding Rushton on 8 March 1989, which discusses some of these
issues. It said:
While defending Professor Rushton's academic freedom and encouraging
his peers to subject his work to the rigorous scrutiny due all research, the
Council of Ontario Universities deplores the insensitivity and absence of
social responsibility that has accompanied Professor Rushton's public
statements and informed his vocabulary.'
Similarly, there is a distinction between the right to include the theory,
and the obligation to handle it responsibly in the classroom.
The problem with a case like Rushton's, however, is that even if he
were to present his materials in a somewhat sensitive manner, he is still
advocating their contents as truth. Assuming he were to present his
materials in class, it would presumably be to teach students about a
"hierarchy" of races. This would be very likely to "poison" the environ-
ment for black students, as it represents exactly the sort of arguments that
have been used against persons of colour historically to demean, disen-
franchise, enslave and otherwise abuse them.1 88 In attempting to balance
the rights of students and professors, the university may have to respond
in creative ways to meet its obligations to both groups. While the
university may not be able to discipline the professor for what he teaches,
it may still be possible to provide the service free from discrimination (as
will be discussed below in the next section).
Rushton's case also raised another important question: whether a
professor's out of class public opinions could poison the classroom, even
186. In Rushton's case, for example, the peer review system resulted in his being denied an
annual increase that he could have received (although the salary issue was overturned by the
University Senate on appeal). The University did acknowledge that if his work continued to
fail peer review, he could be disciplined, ibid.
187. Quoted in "Vedanand grievance", supra note 58 at 33-4 [emphasis added].
188. Particularly problematic were arguments that blacks have smaller brains, and have less
criminal and sexual restraint. These were "proved" by (a) having subjects measure their heads
with tape measures; and (b) statistics that show blacks in greater conflict with the law (without
any analysis of social factors like poverty and discrimination); and (c) purely subjective
information from questionnaires: Page, supra note 183.
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if he or she did not discuss them within the class? The most notorious
example of this situation arose at the University of New Brunswick in
1994, when Professor Yaqzan wrote his now famous letter to the campus
newspaper. Professor Yaqzan argued that women who are the victims of
date rape should accept financial compensation for their loss if they were
not virgins to begin with. 89 One might argue that the reasonable woman
in Yaqzan's class (he taught mathematics) would find that his opinions
were so offensive that he had poisoned her learning environment by
making those opinions known.
At first glance the situation in the Ross case would appear to provide
support for this argument. 90 In that case, an elementary school teacher
made anti-Semitic comments outside of his teaching duties, but not in
class. However, it is important to recall that the question of whether a
poisoned climate has been created is one of fact. In Ross, the human rights
commission heard evidence that there was anti-Semitism in the school,
and made an inference on the facts of the case that it was linked to Ross's
out of class statements. Therefore, this process of analysis is crucial. As
Shirish Chotalia points out, there is not enough evidence available on the
Yaqzan incident to know if his classrooms were in fact a hostile place for
women. However, it would be important to show this and "establish the
link between the professor's ... role in the institution with the creation
of the poisoned educational environment in the institution."' 9' Further,
Chotalia points out that the Yaqzan incident was a singular one, and so
there may not be the frequency required to show that a course of conduct
had been established. 92 Finally, an important caveat is required when
considering the implications of Ross. In that case the Court relied heavily
on the fact that an elementary school teacher is a medium not just for
educational information, but for values and societal mores. The same
should not be said of a university teacher. Despite all of the particular
responsibilities he or she may have, this is not the same as the position of
public trust held by an elementary school teacher.
V. Solutions For Balancing Student and Faculty Rights
As the above analysis suggests, there may be some situations where both
the student and the professor have a compelling claim. Because of the
189. His letter also blamed women who ended up in men's dormitories and were sexually
assaulted, for not foreseeing the danger, and asserted that young men could not help sexually
assaulting in these situations, described in Chotalia, supra note 106 at 604.
190. Supra note 88.
191. Chotalia, supra note 106.
192. Ibid.
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possibility of a parallel action in human rights (along with an arbitration
under the collective agreement or special plan) it is important to recall the
different approaches of these two decision-makers. Given the mandate to
consider the grievor's rights, the labour arbitrator might find that it is
appropriate to allow the professor to continue teaching, based on aca-
demic freedom. On the other hand, a human rights adjudicator might find
that to do so would perpetuate the poisoned climate for students. There-
fore the university could simultaneously do the "right thing" for labour
arbitration purposes, but the "wrong thing" for human rights.
This is where alternatives to discipline may be particularly useful in
order to allow the university to meet its competing obligations under the
human rights legislation, and the collective agreement or special plan.
Where the university is caught between balancing rights, administrators
may have to use more creative solutions than simply punishing or altering
the speech of the professor.
Examples of this would include limiting a professor's teaching obliga-
tions, or requiring that additional material be included in a course to
provide another perspective. There is arbitral authority in Canada that a
university department may set curriculum for courses, and require that
certain core concepts be covered. 193 Thus, in a case like Rushton's the
university might demand that work from competing theorists be included
in the course. Less intrusive measures may include providing "shadow
sections" of the course, taught by other professors, that do not include the
controversial theories or material. 94 These measures, and other potential
responses may help the university to protect itself from a student claim
under human rights legislation. The goal would be to ensure that students
would not be forced to take the professor's course, and so would have a
non-poisoned option. In this way, the university might argue that it had
made the service available in a non-discriminatory way.
193. University of Regina Faculty Association and the University of Regina (1990) (Hereen
Grievance) [unreported]. In that case the arbitrator found that it was reasonable for a
Department Head to ensure that a course that was designated "required" for a degree program
does fulfil the academic purpose for which it was created. The Department Head did not
infringe the professor's academic freedom when she disallowed his choice of textbook because
it did not include a major topic area in the field of study.
194. In one U.S. case, Levin v. Harleston, 966 F.2d 85 (2nd Cir. 1992), the college did exactly
that. Professor Levin held controversial opinions about race that he disseminated in the local
paper, T.V. and student newspaper. The actions taken by the university included setting up
shadow sections of the course, and informing students of their right to take another section of
the course because of Prof. Levin's controversial views. The Court held that this was punishing
Professor Levin for his controversial views under the First Amendment test. However, as
previously outlined, there is no Charter right involved where a Canadian university acts
towards a professor, and even if there were, the Charter is less expansive on freedom of
expression fights than the First Amendment.
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There is the potential that any of these university actions might be
attacked as disciplinary, or as infringing the academic freedom article in
a collective agreement or special plan.'95 An arbitrator would have to
evaluate whether the measures are permissable under the academic
freedom clause. It is important to recall, however, that academic freedom
is not an unfettered right. If students are being harmed by exposure to the
professor, it may not be reasonable to insist that they be forced to take a
particular course with him. An arbitrator may well find that this is not
within the scope of academic freedom.
Conclusion
There have been too few arbitral cases in Canada to fully determine
exactly what conduct will fit within the protections of academic freedom.
There are still unanswered questions about how the right will be balanced
with the competing obligations to the student. Still it seems clear on the
available information that absolute licence for professors (as promul-
gated in the "right to offend" document) is not the correct standard. In
addition to lacking legal support, the absolutist position represents an
abdication of responsibility, and a denial of the real experiences of other
members of the academic community. Instead, a principled approach
may be useful, in which the arbitrator considers the reasonable "victim' s"
response, the context of the professor's conduct, and whether in acting the
way she did, all of her competing employment obligations were met. This
does not mean that all complaints against a professor's classroom
behaviour should result in discipline, nor that there will never be frivolous
or unreasonable complaints. This paper simply argues that it is possible
to consider the limits of academic free speech, and to develop an approach
that is mindful of the unique context of the university classroom.
The right to academic freedom is certainly extremely important, and
it must not be disregarded lightly. For this reason, it is important to give
very wide leeway to faculty who advance academic ideas in the search for
truth. It is essential that this aspect of the academic process be allowed to
flourish. It would be dangerous indeed to have "outsiders" to a particular
field of study substituting their own ideas about the merits of particular
academic theories. At the same time, this paper argues that it is possible
195. There is arbitral authority that a measure that falls short of constituting discipline may
nonetheless breach academic freedom: "Vedanand grievance", supra note 58. For example,
providing shadow sections may send a message that the University believes the Professor to
be wrong, and there may be few students who enrol in the Professor's course.
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to ask questions about whether a professor has responsibly utilized
particular materials or language, and whether a professor has acted
competently. This inquiry should not become sacrosanct territory. De-
spite the unique nature of their role in the university, faculty also have
particular responsibilities in the classroom, which are commensurate
with the authority and control they exercise. It is not asking too much of
faculty that they be aware of these responsibilities, and be required to
present sound rationales for their decisions regarding the classroom. This
is especially so in the case of discriminatory or harassing speech. Students
who are academically qualified have a right to participate in the university
equally, without being subjected to a degrading climate on the basis of
their race, gender, sexual orientation, or other protected ground. Clearly,
if both the students' and the faculty's rights are to be realized, there is a
need for an approach that balances their concerns. The situation on
Canada's university campuses is too complex for absolutist declarations.
